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ABSTRACT
As most users do not precisely know the structure and/or the con-
tent of databases, their queries do not exactly reflect their infor-
mation needs. The database management systems (DBMS) may
interact with users and use their feedback on the returned results
to learn the information needs behind their queries. Current query
interfaces assume that users do not learn and modify the way way
they express their information needs in form of queries during their
interaction with the DBMS. Using a real-world interaction work-
load, we show that users learn and modify how to express their
information needs during their interactions with the DBMS and
their learning is accurately modeled by a well-known reinforcement
learning mechanism. As current data interaction systems assume
that users do not modify their strategies, they cannot discover the
information needs behind users’ queries effectively. We model the
interaction between users and DBMS as a game with identical in-
terest between two rational agents whose goal is to establish a
common language for representing information needs in form of
queries. We propose a reinforcement learning method that learns
and answers the information needs behind queries and adapts to
the changes in users’ strategies and prove that it improves the effec-
tiveness of answering queries stochastically speaking. We propose
two efficient implementation of this method over large relational
databases. Our extensive empirical studies over real-world query
workloads indicate that our algorithms are efficient and effective.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Most users do not know the structure and content of databases and
concepts such as schema or formal query languages sufficiently
well to express their information needs precisely in the form of
queries [15, 35, 36]. They may convey their intents in easy-to-use
but inherently ambiguous forms, such as keyword queries, which
are open to numerous interpretations. Thus, it is very challenging
for a database management system (DBMS) to understand and
satisfy the intents behind these queries. The fundamental challenge
in the interaction of these users and DBMS is that the users and
DBMS represent intents in different forms.
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Many such users may explore a database to find answers for
various intents over a rather long period of time. For these users,
database querying is an inherently interactive and continuing pro-
cess. As both the user and DBMS have the same goal of the user
receiving her desired information, the user and DBMS would like
to gradually improve their understandings of each other and reach
a common language of representing intents over the course of vari-
ous queries and interactions. The user may learn more about the
structure and content of the database and how to express intents
as she submits queries and observes the returned results. Also, the
DBMS may learn more about how the user expresses her intents by
leveraging user feedback on the returned results. The user feedback
may include clicking on the relevant answers [65], the amount of
time the user spends on reading the results [29], user’s eye move-
ments [34], or the signals sent in touch-based devises [42]. Ideally,
the user and DBMS should establish as quickly as possible this
common representation of intents in which the DBMS accurately
understands all or most user’s queries.
Researchers have developed systems that leverage user feedback
to help the DBMS understand the intent behind ill-specified and
vague queries more precisely [11, 12]. These systems, however,
generally assume that a user does not modify her method of ex-
pressing intents throughout her interaction with the DBMS. For
example, they maintain that the user picks queries to express an
intent according to a fixed probability distribution. It is known
that the learning methods that are useful in a static setting do not
deliver desired outcomes in a setting where all agents may modify
their strategies [18, 30]. Hence, one may not be able to use current
techniques to help the DBMS understand the users’ information
need in a rather long-term interaction.
To the best of our knowledge, the impact of user learning on
database interaction has been generally ignored. In this paper, we
propose a novel framework that formalizes the interaction between
the user and the DBMS as a game with identical interest between
two active and potentially rational agents: the user and DBMS.
The common goal of the user and DBMS is to reach a mutual
understanding on expressing information needs in the form of
keyword queries. In each interaction, the user and DBMS receive
certain payoff according to how much the returned results are
relevant to the intent behind the submitted query. The user receives
her payoff by consuming the relevant information and the DBMS
becomes aware of its payoff by observing the user’s feedback on the
returned results. We believe that such a game-theoretic framework
naturally models the long-term interaction between the user and
DBMS. We explore the user learning mechanisms and propose
algorithms for DBMS to improve its understanding of intents behind
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the user queries effectively and efficiently over large databases. In
particular, we make the following contributions:
• Wemodel the long term interaction between the user and DBMS
using keyword queries as a particular type of game called a
signaling game [16] in Section 2.
• Using extensive empirical studies over a real-world interaction
log, we show that users modify the way they express their infor-
mation need over their course of interactions in Section 3. We
also show that this adaptation is accurately modeled by a well-
known reinforcement learning algorithm [53] in experimental
game-theory.
• Current systems generally assume that a user does not learn
and/or modify her method of expressing intents throughout
her interaction with the DBMS. However, it is known that the
learning methods that are useful in static settings do not de-
liver desired outcomes in the dynamic ones [5]. We propose a
method of answering user queries in a natural and interactive
setting in Section 4 and prove that it improves the effectiveness
of answering queries stochastically speaking, and converges
almost surely. We show that our results hold for both the cases
where the user adapts her strategy using an appropriate learn-
ing algorithm and the case where she follows a fixed strategy.
• We describe our data interaction system that provides an ef-
ficient implementation of our reinforcement learning method
on large relational databases in Section 5. In particular, we first
propose an algorithm that implements our learning method
called Reservoir. Then, using certain mild assumptions and the
ideas of sampling over relational operators, we propose another
algorithm called Poisson-Olken that implements our reinforce-
ment learning scheme and considerably improves the efficiency
of Reservoir.
• We report the results of our extensive empirical studies on mea-
suring the effectiveness of our reinforcement learning method
and the efficiency of our algorithms using real-world and large
interaction workloads, queries, and databases in Section 6. Our
results indicate that our proposed reinforcement learningmethod
is more effective than the start-of-the-art algorithm for long-
term interactions. They also show that Poisson-Olken can pro-
cess queries over large databases faster than the Reservoir algo-
rithm.
• Finally, we formally analyze the eventual stable states and equi-
libria of the data interaction game in Section 7. We show that
the game has generally several types of equilibria some of which
are not desirable.
2 A GAME-THEORETIC FRAMEWORK
Users and DBMSs typically achieve a common understanding grad-
ually and using a querying/feedback paradigm. After submitting
each query, the user may revise her strategy of expressing intents
based on the returned result. If the returned answers satisfy her
intent to a large extent, she may keep using the same query to
articulate her intent. Otherwise, she may revise her strategy and
choose another query to express her intent in the hope that the
new query will provide her with more relevant answers. We will
describe this behavior of users in Section 3 in more details. The user
may also inform the database system about the degree by which
the returned answers satisfy the intent behind the query using
explicit or implicit feedback, e.g., click-through information [29].
The DBMS may update its interpretation of the query according to
the user’s feedback.
Intuitively, one may model this interaction as a game between
two agents with identical interests in which the agents communi-
cate via sharing queries, results, and feedback on the results. In each
interaction, both agents will receive some reward according to the
degree by which the returned result for a query matches its intent.
The user receives her rewards in the form of answers relevant to her
intent and the DBMS receives its reward through getting positive
feedback on the returned results. The final goal of both agents is to
maximize the amount of reward they receive during the course of
their interaction. Next, we describe the components and structure
of this interaction game for relational databases.
Basic Definitions:We fix two disjoint (countably) infinite sets
of attributes and relation symbols. Every relation symbol R is asso-
ciated with a set of attribute symbols denoted as sort(R). Let dom
be a countably infinite set of constants, e.g., strings. An instance IR
of relation symbol R with n = |sort(R)| is a (finite) subset of domn .
A schema S is a set of relation symbols. A database (instance) of S
is a mapping over S that associates with each relation symbol R in
S an instance of IR . In this paper, we assume that dom is a set of
strings.
2.1 Intent
An intent represents an information need sought after by the user.
Current keyword query interfaces over relational databases gener-
ally assume that each intent is a query in a sufficiently expressive
query language in the domain of interest, e.g., Select-Project-Join
subset of SQL [15, 36]. Our framework and results are orthogonal
to the language that precisely describes the users’ intents. Table 1
illustrates a database with schema Univ(Name, Abbreviation, State,
Type, Ranking) that contains information about university rank-
ings. A user may want to find the information about university
MSU in Michigan, which is precisely represented by the intent
e2 in Table 2(a), which using the Datalog syntax [1] is: ans(z) ←
Univ(x , ‘MSU ’, ‘MI ’,y, z).
2.2 Query
Users’ articulations of their intents are queries. Many users do not
know the formal query language, e.g., SQL, that precisely describes
their intents. Thus, they may prefer to articulate their intents in
languages that are easy-to-use, relatively less complex, and am-
biguous such as keyword query language [15, 36]. In the proposed
game-theoretic frameworks for database interaction, we assume
that the user expresses her intents as keyword queries. More for-
mally, we fix a countably infinite set of terms, i.e., keywords, T . A
keyword query (query for short) is a nonempty (finite) set of terms
inT . Consider the database instance in Table 1. Table 2 depicts a set
of intents and queries over this database. Suppose the user wants
to find the information about Michigan State University in Michi-
gan, i.e. the intent e2. Because the user does not know any formal
database query language and may not be sufficiently familiar with
the content of the data, she may express intent e2 using q2 : ‘MSU’.
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Some users may know a formal database query language that
is sufficiently expressive to represent their intents. Nevertheless,
because they may not know precisely the content and schema of
the database, their submitted queries may not always be the same
as their intents [12, 38]. For example, a user may know how to write
a SQL query. But, since she may not know the state abbreviation
MI, she may articulate intent e2 as ans(t) ←Univ(x , ‘MSU ’,y, z, t),
which is different from e2. We plan to extend our framework for
these scenarios in future work. But, in this paper, we assume that
users articulate their intents as keyword queries.
2.3 User Strategy
The user strategy indicates the likelihood by which the user submits
queryq given that her intent is e . In practice, a user has finitelymany
intents and submits finitely many queries in a finite period of time.
Hence, we assume that the sets of the user’s intents and queries
are finite. We index each user’s intent and query by 1 ≤ i ≤ m
and 1 ≤ j ≤ n, respectively. A user strategy, denoted as U , is a
m × n row-stochastic matrix from her intents to her queries. The
matrix on the top of Table 3(a) depicts a user strategy using intents
and queries in Table 2. According to this strategy, the user submits
query q2 to express intents e1, e2, and e3.
Table 1: A database instance of relation Univ
Name Abbreviation State Type Rank
Missouri State University MSU MO public 20
Mississippi State University MSU MS public 22
Murray State University MSU KY public 14
Michigan State University MSU MI public 18
Table 2: Intents and Queries
2(a) Intents
Intent# Intent
e1 ans(z) ← Univ(x, ‘MSU ’, ‘MS ’, y, z)
e2 ans(z) ← Univ(x, ‘MSU ’, ‘MI ’, y, z)
e3 ans(z) ← Univ(x, ‘MSU ’, ‘MO ’, y, z)
2(b) Queries
Query# Query
q1 ‘MSU MI’
q2 ‘MSU’
2.4 DBMS Strategy
The DBMS interprets queries to find the intents behind them. It
usually interprets queries by mapping them to a subset of SQL
[15, 32, 44]. Since the final goal of users is to see the result of ap-
plying the interpretation(s) on the underlying database, the DBMS
runs its interpretation(s) over the database and returns its results.
Moreover, since the user may not know SQL, suggesting possible
SQL queries may not be useful. A DBMS may not exactly know
the language that can express all users’ intents. Current usable
query interfaces, including keyword query systems, select a query
Table 3: Two strategy profiles over the intents and queries
in Table 2. User and DBMS strategies at the top and bottom,
respectively.
3(a) A strategy profile
q1 q2
e1 0 1
e2 0 1
e3 0 1
e1 e2 e3
q1 0 1 0
q2 0 1 0
3(b) Another strategy profile
q1 q2
e1 0 1
e2 1 0
e3 0 1
e1 e2 e3
q1 0 1 0
q2 0.5 0 0.5
language for the interpreted intents that is sufficiently complex
to express many users’ intents and is simple enough so that the
interpretation and running its outcome(s) are done efficiently [15].
As an example consider current keyword query interfaces over
relational databases [15]. Given constant v in database I and key-
word w in keyword query q, letmatch(v,w) be a function that is
true ifw appears in v and false otherwise. A majority of keyword
query interfaces interpret keyword queries as Select-Project-Join
queries that have below certain number of joins and whose where
clauses contain only conjunctions ofmatch functions [32, 44]. Us-
ing a larger subset of SQL, e.g. the ones with more joins, makes
it inefficient to perform the interpretation and run its outcomes.
Given schema S , the interpretation language of the DBMS, denoted
as L, is a subset of SQL over S . We precisely define L for our imple-
mentation of DBMS strategy in Section 5. To interpret a keyword
query, the DBMS searches L for the SQL queries that represent the
intent behind the query as accurately as possible.
Because users may be overwhelmed by the results of many in-
terpretations, keyword query interfaces use a deterministic real-
valued scoring function to rank their interpretations and deliver
only the results of top-k ones to the user [15]. It is known that such
a deterministic approach may significantly limit the accuracy of
interpreting queries in long-term interactions in which the informa-
tion system utilizes user’s feedback [4, 31, 63]. Because the DBMS
shows only the result of interpretation(s) with the highest score(s)
to the user, it receives feedback only on a small set of interpreta-
tions. Thus, its learning remains largely biased toward the initial set
of highly ranked interpretations. For example, it may never learn
that the intent behind a query is satisfied by an interpretation with
a relatively low score according to the current scoring function.
To better leverage users feedback during the interaction, the
DBMS must show the results of and get feedback on a sufficiently
diverse set of interpretations [4, 31, 63]. Of course, the DBMS should
ensure that this set of interpretations are relatively relevant to the
query, otherwise the user may become discouraged and give up
querying. This dilemma is called the exploitation versus exploration
trade-off. A DBMS that only exploits, returns top-ranked interpre-
tations according to its scoring function. Hence, the DBMS may
adopt a stochastic strategy to both exploit and explore: it randomly
selects and shows the results of intents such that the ones with
higher scores are chosen with larger probabilities [4, 31, 63]. In
this approach, users are mostly shown results of interpretations
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that are relevant to their intents according to the current knowl-
edge of the DBMS and provide feedback on a relatively diverse set
of interpretations. More formally, given Q is a set of all keyword
queries, the DBMS strategy D is a stochastic mapping from Q to
L. To the best of our knowledge, to search L efficiently, current
keyword query interfaces limit their search per query to a finite
subset of L [15, 32, 44]. In this paper, we follow a similar approach
and assume that D maps each query to only a finite subset of L.
The matrix on the bottom of Table 3(a) depicts a DBMS strategy
for the intents and queries in Table 2. Based on this strategy, the
DBMS uses a exploitative strategy and always interprets query q2
as e2. The matrix on the bottom of Table 3(b) depicts another DBMS
strategy for the same set of intents and queries. In this example,
DBMS uses a randomized strategy and does both exploitation and
exploration. For instance, it explores e1 and e2 to answer q2 with
equal probabilities, but it always returns e2 in the response to q1.
2.5 Interaction & Adaptation
The data interaction game is a repeated game with identical interest
between two players, the user and the DBMS. At each round of the
game, i.e., a single interaction, the user selects an intent according
to the prior probability distribution π . She then picks the query q
according to her strategy and submits it to the DBMS. The DBMS
observes q and interprets q based on its strategy, and returns the
results of the interpretation(s) on the underlying database to the
user. The user provides some feedback on the returned tuples and
informs the DBMS how relevant the tuples are to her intent. In this
paper, we assume that the user informs the DBMS if some tuples
satisfy the intent via some signal, e.g., selecting the tuple, in some
interactions. The feedback signals may be noisy, e.g., a user may
click on a tuple by mistake. Researchers have proposed models to
accurately detect the informative signals [31]. Dealing with the
issue of noisy signals is out of the scope of this paper.
The goal of both the user and the DBMS is to have as many
satisfying tuples as possible in the returned tuples. Hence, both
the user and the DBMS receive some payoff, i.e., reward, according
to the degree by which the returned tuples match the intent. This
payoff is measured based on the user feedback and using standard
effectiveness metrics [46]. One example of such metrics is preci-
sion at k , p@k , which is the fraction of relevant tuples in the top-k
returned tuples. At the end of each round, both the user and the
DBMS receive a payoff equal to the value of the selected effective-
ness metric for the returned result. We denote the payoff received
by the players at each round of the game, i.e., a single interaction,
for returning interpretation eℓ for intent ei as r (ei , eℓ). This payoff
is computed using the user’s feedback on the result of interpretation
eℓ over the underlying database.
Next, we compute the expected payoff of the players. Since DBMS
strategyD maps each query to a finite set of interpretations, and the
set of submitted queries by a user, or a population of users, is finite,
the set of interpretations for all queries submitted by a user, denoted
as Ls , is finite. Hence, we show the DBMS strategy for a user as
an n × o row-stochastic matrix from the set of the user’s queries to
the set of interpretations Ls . We index each interpretation in Ls by
1 ≤ ℓ ≤ o. Each pair of the user and the DBMS strategy, (U ,D), is a
strategy profile. The expected payoff for both players with strategy
profile (U ,D) is as follows.
ur (U ,D) =
m∑
i=1
πi
n∑
j=1
Ui j
o∑
ℓ=1
D jℓ r (ei , eℓ), (1)
The expected payoff reflects the degree bywhich the user andDBMS
have reached a common language for communication. This value is
high for the case in which the user knows which queries to pick to
articulate her intents and the DBMS returns the results that satisfy
the intents behind the user’s queries. Hence, this function reflects
the success of the communication and interaction. For example,
given that all intents have equal prior probabilities, intuitively,
the strategy profile in Table 3(b) shows a larger degree of mutual
understanding between the players than the one in Table 3(a). This
is reflected in their values of expected payoff as the expected payoffs
of the former and latter are 23 and
1
3 , respectively. We note that the
DBMS may not know the set of users’ queries beforehand and does
not compute the expected payoff directly. Instead, it uses query
answering algorithms that leverage user feedback, such that the
expected payoff improves over the course of several interactions as
we will show in Section 4.
None of the players know the other player’s strategy during
the interaction. Given the information available to each player, it
may modify its strategy at the end of each round (interaction). For
example, the DBMS may reduce the probability of returning certain
interpretations that has not received any positive feedback from
the user in the previous rounds of the game. Let the user and DBMS
strategy at round t ∈ N of the game be U (t) and D(t), respectively.
In round t ∈ N of the game, the user and DBMS have access to the
information about their past interactions. The user has access to
her sequence of intents, queries, and results, the DBMS knows the
sequence of queries and results, and both players have access to
the sequence of payoffs (not expected payoffs) up to round t − 1. It
depends on the degree of rationality and abilities of the user and the
DBMS how to leverage these pieces of information to improve the
expected payoff of the game. For example, it may not be reasonable
to assume that the user adopts a mechanism that requires instant
access to the detailed information about her past interactions as it
is not clear whether users can memorize this information for a long-
term interaction. A data interaction game is represented as tuple
(U (t),D(t),π , (eu (t − 1)), (q(t − 1)), (ed (t − 1)), (r (t − 1))) in which
U (t) and D(t) are respectively the strategies of the user and DBMS
at round t , π is the prior probability of intents inU , (eu (t −1)) is the
sequence of intents, (q(t − 1)) is the sequence of queries, (ed (t − 1))
is the sequence of interpretations, and (r (t − 1))) is the sequence
of payoffs up to time t . Table 4 contains the notation and concept
definitions introduced in this section for future reference.
3 USER LEARNING MECHANISM
It is well established that humans show reinforcement behavior in
learning [48, 57]. Many lab studies with human subjects conclude
that one can model human learning using reinforcement learning
models [48, 57]. The exact reinforcement learning method used by
a person, however, may vary based on her capabilities and the task
at hand. We have performed an empirical study of a real-world
interaction log to find the reinforcement learning method(s) that
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Table 4: Summary of the notations used in the model.
Notation Definition
ei A user’s intent
qj A query submitted by the user
πi The prior probability that the user queries for ei
r (ei , eℓ) The reward when the user looks for ei and the DBMS
returns eℓ
U The user strategy
Ui j The probability that user submits qj for intent ei
D The DBMS strategy
D jℓ The probability that DBMS intent eℓ for query qj
(U ,D) A strategy profile
ur (U ,D) The expected payoff of the strategy profile (U ,D)
computed using reward metric r based to Equation 1
best explain the mechanism by which users adapt their strategies
during interaction with a DBMS.
3.1 Reinforcement Learning Methods
To provide a comprehensive comparison, we evaluate six reinforce-
ment learningmethods used tomodel human learning in experimen-
tal game theory and/or Human Computer Interaction (HCI) [10, 53].
These methods mainly vary based on 1) the degree by which the
user considers past interactions when computing future strategies,
2) how they update the user strategy, and 3) the rate by which they
update the user strategy. Win-Keep/Lose-Randomize keeps a query
with non-zero reward in past interactions for an intent. If such a
query does not exist, it picks a query randomly. Latest-Reward rein-
forces the probability of using a query to express an intent based on
the most recent reward of the query to convey the intent. Bush and
Mosteller’s and Cross’s models increases (decreases) the probability
of using a query based its past success (failures) of expressing an in-
tent. A query is successful if it delivers a reward more than a given
threshold, e.g., zero. Roth and Erev’s model uses the aggregated
reward from past interactions to compute the probability by which
a query is used. Roth and Erev’s modified model is similar to Roth
and Erev’s model, with an additional parameter that determines to
what extent the user forgets the reward received for a query in past
interactions.
3.1.1 Win-Keep/Lose-Randomize. This method uses only the
most recent interaction for an intent to determine the queries used
to express the intent in the future [7]. Assume that the user conveys
an intent e by a query q. If the reward of using q is above a specified
threshold τ the user will use q to express e in the future. Otherwise,
the user randomly picks another query uniformly at random to
express e .
3.1.2 Bush and Mosteller’s Model: Bush and Mosteller’s model
increases the probability that a user will choose a given query to
express an intent by an amount proportional to the reward of using
that query and the current probability of using this query for the
intent [9]. It also decreases the probabilities of queries not used in
a successful interaction. If a user receives reward r for using q(t) at
time t to express intent ei , the model updates the probabilities of
using queries in the user strategy as follows.
Ui j (t + 1) =
{
Ui j (t) + αBM · (1 −Ui j (t)) qj = q(t) ∧ r ≥ 0
Ui j (t) − βBM ·Ui j (t) qj = q(t) ∧ r < 0
(2)
Ui j (t + 1) =
{
Ui j (t) − αBM ·Ui j (t) qj , q(t) ∧ r ≥ 0
Ui j (t) + βBM · (1 −Ui j (t) qj , q(t) ∧ r < 0
(3)
αBM ∈ [0, 1] and βBM ∈ [0, 1] are parameters of the model. If
queryqj is equal toq(t) then Equation 2 is used. For all other queries
qj for the intent ei at time t , Equation 3 is used. The probabilities
of using queries for intents other than ei remains unchanged. Since
effectiveness metrics in interaction are always greater than zero,
βBM is never used in our experiments.
3.1.3 Cross’s Model: Cross’s model modifies the user’s strategy
similar to Bush and Mosteller’s model [17], but uses the amount
of the received reward to update the user strategy. Given a user
receives reward r for using q(t) at time t to express intent ei , we
have:
Ui j (t + 1) =
{
Ui j (t) + R(r ) · (1 −Ui j (t)) qj = q(t)
Ui j (t) − R(r ) ·Ui j (t) qj , q(t)
(4)
R(r ) = αC · r + βC (5)
Parameters αC ∈ [0, 1] and βC ∈ [0, 1] are used to compute the
adjusted reward R(r ) based on the value of actual reward r . The
parameter βC is a static increment of the adjusted reward. Similar
to Bush and Mosteller’s model, the aforementioned formulas are
used to update the probabilities of using queries for the intent ei
in the current interaction. Other entries in the user’s strategy are
remained unchanged.
3.1.4 Roth and Erev’s Model: Roth and Erev’s model reinforces
the probabilities directly from the reward value r that is received
when the user uses query q(t) [53]. Its most important difference
with other models is that it explicitly accumulates all the rewards
gained by using a query to express an intent. Si j (t) in matrix S(t)
maintains the accumulated reward of using query qj to express
intent ei over the course of interaction up to round (time) t .
Si j (t + 1) =
{
Si j (t) + r qj = q(t)
Si j (t) qj , q(t)
(6)
Ui j (t + 1) =
Si j (t + 1)
n∑
j′
Si j′(t + 1)
(7)
Roth and Erev’s model increases the probability of using a query
to express an intent based on the accumulated rewards of using
that query over the long-term interaction of the user. Each query
not used in a successful interaction will be implicitly penalized as
when the probability of a query increases, all others will decrease
to keepU row-stochastic.
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3.1.5 Roth and Erev’s Modified Model: Roth and Erev’s modified
model is similar to the original Roth and Erev’s model, but it has
an additional parameter that determines to what extent the user
takes in to account the outcomes of her past interactions with the
system [23]. It is reasonable to assume that the user may forget
the results of her much earlier interactions with the system. User’s
memory is imperfect which means that over time the strategy
may change merely due to the forgetful nature of the user. This is
accounted for by the forget parameter σ ∈ [0, 1]. Matrix S(t) has
the same role it has for the Roth and Erev’s model.
Si j (t + 1) = (1 − σ ) · Si j (t) + E(j,R(r )) (8)
E(j,R(r )) =
{
R(r ) · (1 − ϵ) qj = q(t)
R(r ) · (ϵ) qj , q(t)
(9)
R(r ) = r − rmin (10)
Ui j (t + 1) =
Si j (t + 1)
n∑
j′
Si j′(t + 1)
(11)
In the aforementioned formulas, ϵ ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter that
weights the reward that the user receives,n is the maximum number
of possible queries for a given intent ei , and rmin is the minimum
expected reward that the user wants to receive. The intuition be-
hind this parameter is that the user often assumes some minimum
amount of reward is guaranteed when she queries the database.
The model uses this minimum amount to discount the received
reward. We set rmin to 0 in our analysis, representing that there is
no expected reward in an interaction.
3.2 Empirical Analysis
3.2.1 Interaction Logs. We use an anonymized Yahoo! interac-
tion log for our empirical study, which consists of queries submitted
to a Yahoo! search engine in July 2010 [64]. Each record in the log
consists of a time stamp, user cookie id, submitted query, the top 10
results displayed to the user, and the positions of the user clicks on
the returned answers. Generally speaking, typical users of Yahoo!
are normal users who may not know advanced concepts, such as
formal query language and schema, and use keyword queries to
find their desired information. Yahoo! may generally use a com-
bination of structured and unstructured datasets to satisfy users’
intents. Nevertheless, as normal users are not aware of the exis-
tence of schema and mainly rely on the content of the returned
answers to (re)formulate their queries, we expect that the users’
learning mechanisms over this dataset closely resemble their learn-
ing mechanisms over structured data. We have used three different
contiguous subsamples of this log whose information is shown
in Table 7. The duration of each subsample is the time between
the time-stamp of the first and last interaction records. Because
we would like to specifically look at the users that exhibit some
learning throughout their interaction, we have collected only the
interactions in which a user submits at least two different queries to
express the same intent. The records of the 8H-interaction sample
appear at the beginning of the the 43H-interaction sample, which
themselves appear at the beginning of the 101H-interaction sample.
Table 5 illustrates an example of what the log record looks like.
Note, for the Results column, there are 10 results returned. Table 6
illustrates an example of the relevance judgment scores dataset.
For example, if the user entered QueryID = 00002e f d and one of
results returned was ResultID = 2722a07f , then the relevance of
that result would be three.
Table 5: Log Record Example
QueryID CookieID TimeStampID Results
00002efd 1deac14e 1279486689 2722a07f ... e1468bbf
12fe75b7 4b74d72d 1279546874 dc381b38 ... df9a561f
Table 6: Relevance Judgment Score Example
QueryID ResultID Score
00002efd 2722a07f 3
12fe75b7 dc381b38 4
3.2.2 Intent & Reward. Accompanying the interaction log is a
set of relevance judgment scores for each query and result pair. Each
relevance judgment score is a value between 0 and 4 and shows the
degree of relevance of the result to the query, with 0 meaning not
relevant at all and 4 meaning the most relevant result. We define
the intent behind each query as the set of results with non-zero
relevance scores. We use the standard ranking quality metric NDCG
for the returned results of a query as the reward in each interaction
as it models different levels of relevance [46]. The value of NDCG
is between 0 and 1 and it is 1 for the most effective list.
Table 7: Subsamples of Yahoo! interaction log
Duration #Interactions #Users #Queries #Intents
~8H 622 272 111 62
~43H 12323 4056 341 151
~101H 195468 79516 13976 4829
3.2.3 Parameter Estimation. Some models, e.g., Cross’s model,
have some parameters that need to be trained. We have used a set of
5,000 records that appear in the interaction log immediately before
the first subsample of Table 7 and found the optimal values for
those parameters using grid search and the sum of squared errors.
3.2.4 Training & Testing. We train and test a single user strategy
over each subsample and model, which represents the strategy
of the user population in each subsample. The user strategy in
each model is initialized with a uniform distribution, so that all
queries are equally likely to be used for an intent. After estimating
parameters, we train the user strategy using each model over 90%
of the total number of records in each selected subsample in the
order by which the records appear in the interaction log. We use
the value of NDCG as reward for the models that use rewards to
update the user strategy after each interaction. We then test the
accuracy of the prediction of using a query to express an intent for
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each model over the remaining 10% of each subsample using the
user strategy computed at the end of the training phase. Each intent
is conveyed using only a single query in the testing portions of our
subsamples. Hence, no learning is done in the testing phase and
we do not update the user strategies. We report the mean squared
errors over all intents in the testing phase for each subsample and
model in Figure 1. A lower mean squared error implies that the
model more accurately represents the users’ learning method. We
have excluded the Latest Reward results from the figure as they are
an order of magnitude worse than the others.
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Figure 1: Accuracies of learning over the subsamples of Ta-
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3.2.5 Results. Win-Keep/Lose-Randomize performs surprisingly
more accurate than other methods for the 8H-interaction subsample.
It indicates that in short-term and/or beginning of their interactions,
users may not have enough interactions to leverage a more com-
plex learning scheme and use a rather simple mechanism to update
their strategies. Both Roth and Erev’s methods use the accumulated
reward values to adjust the user strategy gradually. Hence, they can-
not preciselymodel user learning over a rather short interaction and
are less accurate than relatively more aggressive learning models
such as Bush and Mosteller’s and Cross’s over this subsample. Both
Roth and Erev’s deliver the same result and outperform other meth-
ods in the 43-H and 101-H subsamples. Win-Keep/Lose-Randomize
is the least accurate method over these subsamples. Since larger
subsamples provide more training data, the predication accuracy of
all models improves as the interaction subsamples becomes larger.
The learned value for the forget parameter in the Roth and Erev’s
modified model is very small and close to zero in our experiments,
therefore, it generally acts like the Roth and Erev’s model.
Long-term communications between users and DBMS may in-
clude multiple sessions. Since Yahoo! query workload contains the
time stamps and user ids of each interaction, we have been able
to extract the starting and ending times of each session. Our re-
sults indicate that as long as the user and DBMS communicate over
sufficiently many of interactions, e.g., about 10k for Yahoo! query
workload, the users follow the Roth and Erev’s model of learning.
Given that the communication of the user and DBMS involve suf-
ficiently many interactions, we have not observed any difference
in the mechanism by which users learn based on the numbers of
sessions in the user and DBMS communication.
3.2.6 Conclusion. Our analysis indicates that users show a sub-
stantially intelligent behavior when adopting and modifying their
strategies over relatively medium and long-term interactions. They
leverage their past interactions and their outcomes, i.e., have an
effective long-term memory. This behavior is most accurately mod-
eled using Roth and Erev’s model. Hence, in the rest of the paper,
we set the user learning method to this model.
4 LEARNING ALGORITHM FOR DBMS
Current systems generally assume that a user does not learn and/or
modify her method of expressing intents throughout her interaction
with the DBMS. However, it is known that the learning methods
that are useful in static settings do not deliver desired outcomes
in the dynamic ones [5]. Moreover, it has been shown that if the
players do not use the right learning algorithms in games with
identical interests, the game and its payoff may not converge to any
desired states [55]. Thus, choosing the correct learning mechanism
for the DBMS is crucial to improve the payoff and converge to a
desired state. The following algorithmic questions are of interest:
i. How can a DBMS learn or adapt to a user’s strategy?
ii. Mathematically, is a given learning algorithm effective?
iii. What would be the asymptotic behavior of a given learning
algorithm?
Here, we address the first and the second questions above. Dealing
with the third question is far beyond the scope and space of this
paper. A summary of the notations introduced in Section 2 and
used in this section can be found in Table 4.
4.1 DBMS Reinforcement Learning
We adopt Roth and Erev’s learning method for adaptation of the
DBMS strategy, with a slight modification. The original Roth and
Erev method considers only a single action space. In our work, this
would translate to having only a single query. Instead we extend
this such that each query has its own action space or set of possible
intents. The adaptation happens over discrete time t = 0, 1, 2, 3, . . .
instances where t denotes the tth interaction of the user and the
DBMS. We refer to t simply as the iteration of the learning rule. For
simplicity of notation, we refer to intent ei and result sℓ as intent i
and ℓ, respectively, in the rest of the paper. Hence, we may rewrite
the expected payoff for both user and DBMS as:
ur (U ,D) =
m∑
i=1
πi
n∑
j=1
Ui j
o∑
ℓ=1
D jℓriℓ ,
where r : [m] × [o] → R+ is the effectiveness measure between
the intent i and the result, i.e., decoded intent ℓ. With this, the
reinforcement learning mechanism for the DBMS adaptation is as
follows.
a. Let R(0) > 0 be an n × o initial reward matrix whose entries are
strictly positive.
b. LetD(0) be the initial DBMS strategywithD jℓ(0) = Rjℓ (0)∑o
ℓ=1 Rjℓ (0) >
0 for all j ∈ [n] and ℓ ∈ [o].
c. For iterations t = 1, 2, . . ., do
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i. If the user’s query at time t is q(t), DBMS returns a result
E(t) ∈ E with probability:
P(E(t) = i ′ | q(t)) = Dq(t )i′(t).
ii. User gives a reward rii′ given that i is the intent of the user
at time t . Note that the reward depends both on the intent i
at time t and the result i ′. Then, set
Rjℓ(t + 1) =
{
Rjℓ(t) + riℓ if j = q(t) and ℓ = i ′
Rjℓ(t) otherwise . (12)
iii. Update the DBMS strategy by
D ji (t + 1) =
Rji (t + 1)∑o
ℓ=1 Rjℓ(t + 1)
, (13)
for all j ∈ [n] and i ∈ [o].
In the above scheme R(t) is simply the reward matrix at time t .
Few comments are in order regarding the above adaptation rule:
- One can use available ranking functions, e.g. [12], for the initial
reward condition R(0) which possibly leads to an intuitive initial
point for the learning rule. One may normalize and convert the
scores returned by these functions to probability values.
- In step c.ii., if the DBMS has the knowledge of the user’s intent
after the interactions (e.g. through a click), the DBMS sets Rji + 1
for the known intent i . The mathematical analysis of both cases
will be similar.
- In the initial step, as the DBMS uses a ranking function to com-
pute the probabilities, it may not materialize R andD. As the game
progresses, DBMS maintains the strategy and reward matrices
with entries for only the observed queries, their underlying in-
tents, and their returned results. Hence, the DBMS does not need
to materialize R and D for the sets of possible intents, queries,
and results. DBMS also does not need to know the set of user’s
interns beforehand. Hence, the algorithm is practical for the cases
where the sought-for intents, submitted queries, and returned
results are not very large. Moreover, R and D are generally sparse.
As queries and intents generally follow a power law distribution
[46], one may use sampling techniques to use this algorithm in
other settings. The rigorous theoretical and empirical analysis of
applying such techniques are interesting subjects of future work.
4.2 Analysis of the Learning Rule
We show in Section 3 that users modify their strategies in data
interactions. Nevertheless, ideally, one would like to use a learning
mechanism for the DBMS that accurately discovers the intents be-
hind users’ queries whether or not the users modify their strategies,
as it is not certain that all users will always modify their strategies.
Also, in some relevant applications, the user’s learning is happening
in a much slower time-scale compared to the learning of the DBMS.
So, one can assume that the user’s strategy is fixed compared to the
time-scale of the DBMS adaptation. Therefore, first, we consider the
case that the user is not adapting her strategy, i.e., she has a fixed
strategy during the interaction. Then, we consider the case that the
user’s strategy is adapting to the DBMS’s strategy but perhaps on
a slower time-scale in Section 4.3.
In this section, we provide an analysis of the reinforcement mech-
anism provided above and will show that, statistically speaking,
the adaptation rule leads to improvement of the efficiency of the
interaction. Note that since the user gives feedback only on one
tuple in the result, one can without the loss of generality assume
that the cardinality of the list k is 1.
For the analysis of the reinforcement learning mechanism in
Section 4 and for simplification, denote
u(t) := ur (U ,D(t)) = ur (U ,D(t)), (14)
for an effectiveness measure r as ur is defined in (1).
We recall that a random process {X (t)} is a submartingale [21]
if it is absolutely integrable (i.e. E(|X (t)|) < ∞ for all t ) and
E(X (t + 1) | Ft ) ≥ X (t),
where Ft is the history or σ -algebra generated by X1, . . . ,Xt . In
other words, a process {X (t)} is a sub-martingale if the expected
value of X (t + 1) given X (t),X (t − 1), . . . ,X (0), is not strictly less
than the value of Xt . Note that submartingales are nothing but
the stochastic counterparts of monotonically increasing sequences.
As in the case of bounded (from above) monotonically increasing
sequences, submartingales pose the same property, i.e. any sub-
martingale {X (t)} with E(|X (t)|) < B for some B ∈ R+ and all
t ≥ 0 is convergent almost surely. We refer the interested readers to
[21] for further information on this result (martingale convergence
theorem).
The main result in this section is that the sequence of the utilities
{u(t)} (which is indeed a stochastic process as {D(t)} is a stochastic
process) defined by (14) is a submartignale when the reinforcement
learning rule in Section 4 is utilized. As a result the proposed re-
inforcement learning rule stochastically improves the efficiency of
communication between the DBMS and the user. More importantly,
this holds for an arbitrary reward/effectiveness measure r . This is
rather a very strong result as the algorithm is robust to the choice
of the reward mechanism.
To show this, we discuss an intermediate result. For simplicity
of notation, we fix the time t and we use superscript + to denote
variables at time (t + 1) and drop the dependencies at time t for
variables depending on time t . Throughout the rest of our discus-
sions, we let {Ft } be the natural filtration for the process {D(t)},
i.e. F is the σ -algebra generated by D(0), . . . ,D(t).
Lemma 4.1. For any ℓ ∈ [m] and j ∈ [n], we have
E(D+jℓ | Ft ) − D jℓ
= D jℓ ·
m∑
i=1
πiUi j
(
riℓ
R¯j + ril
−
o∑
ℓ′=1
D jℓ′
riℓ′
R¯j + riℓ′
)
,
where R¯j =
∑o
ℓ′=1 Rjℓ′ .
Proof. Fix ℓ ∈ [m] and j ∈ [n]. Let A be the event that at the
t ’th iteration, we reinforce a pair (j, ℓ′) for some ℓ′ ∈ [m]. Then on
the complement Ac of A, D+jℓ(ω) = D jℓ(ω). Let Ai, ℓ′ ⊆ A be the
subset of A such that the intent of the user is i and the pair (j, ℓ′) is
reinforced. Note that the collection of sets {Ai, ℓ′} for i, ℓ′ ∈ [m],
are pairwise mutually exclusive and their union constitute the set
A.
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We note that
D+jℓ =
m∑
i=1
©­­­«
Rjℓ + ril
R¯j + riℓ
1Ai, ℓ +
o∑
ℓ′=1
ℓ′,ℓ
Rjℓ
R¯j + riℓ′
1Ai, ℓ′
ª®®®¬
+ D jℓ1Ac .
Therefore, we have
E(D+jℓ | Ft ) =
m∑
i=1
πiUi jD jℓ
Rjℓ + riℓ
R¯j + riℓ
+
m∑
i=1
πiUi j
∑
ℓ,ℓ′
D jℓ′
Rjℓ
R¯j + riℓ′
+ (1 − p)D jℓ ,
where p = P(A | F ). Note that D jℓ = RjiR¯j and hence,
E(D+jℓ | Ft ) − D jℓ =
m∑
i=1
πiUi jD jℓ
riℓR¯j − Rjℓ
R¯j (R¯j + riℓ)
−
m∑
i=1
πiUi j
∑
ℓ,ℓ′
D jℓ′
Rjℓriℓ′
R¯j (R¯j + riℓ′)
.
Replacing RjlR¯j with D jℓ and rearranging the terms in the above
expression, we get the result. □
To show the main result, we will utilize the following result in
martingale theory.
Theorem 4.2. [52] A random process {Xt } converges almost surely
if Xt is bounded, i.e., E(|Xt |) < B for some B ∈ R+ and all t ≥ 0 and
E(Xt+1 |Ft ) ≥ Xt − βt (15)
where βt ≥ 0 is a summable sequence almost surely, i.e., ∑t βt < ∞
with probability 1.
Note that this result is a weaker form of the Robins-Siegmund
martingale convergence theorem in [52] but it will serve for the
purpose of our discussion.
Using Lemma 4.1 and the above result, we show that up to a
summable disturbance, the proposed learningmechanism is stochas-
tically improving.
Theorem 4.3. Let {u(t)} be the sequence given by (14). Then,
E(u(t + 1 | Ft ) ≥ E(u(t) | Ft ) − βt ,
for some non-negative random process {βt } that is summable (i.e.∑∞
t=0 β < ∞ almost surely). As a result {u(t)} converges almost
surely.
Proof. Let u+ := u(t + 1), u := u(t),
u j := u j (U (t),D(t)) =
m∑
i=1
o∑
ℓ=1
πiUi jD jℓriℓ(t ),
and also define R¯j :=
∑m
ℓ′=1 Rjℓ′ . Note that u
j is the efficiency of
the jth signal/query.
Using the linearity of conditional expectation and Lemma 4.1,
we have:
E(u+ | Ft ) − u =
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
πiUi j
o∑
ℓ=1
riℓ′
(
E(D+jℓ | Ft ) − D jℓ
)
=
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
o∑
ℓ=1
πiUi jD jℓriℓ
( m∑
i′=1
π ′iUi′j
(
ri′ℓ
R¯j + ri′ℓ
−
o∑
ℓ′=1
D jℓ′
ri′ℓ′
R¯j + ri′ℓ′
))
. (16)
Now, let yjℓ =
∑m
i=1 πiUi jriℓ and zjℓ =
∑m
i=1 πiUi j
riℓ
R¯j+riℓ
. Then,
we get from the above expression that
E(u+ | Ft ) − u =
n∑
j=1
( o∑
ℓ=1
D jℓyiℓzjℓ −
o∑
ℓ=1
D jℓyjℓ
o∑
ℓ′=1
D jℓ′zjℓ′
)
. (17)
Now, we express the above expression as
E(u+ | Ft ) − u = Vt + V˜t (18)
where
Vt =
n∑
j=1
1
R¯j
©­«
o∑
ℓ=1
D jℓy
2
jℓ −
( o∑
l=1
D jℓyjℓ
)2ª®¬ ,
and
V˜t =
n∑
j=1
( o∑
ℓ=1
D jℓyjℓ
o∑
ℓ′=1
D jℓ′z˜jℓ′ −
m∑
ℓ=1
D jℓyjℓz˜jℓ
)
. (19)
Further, z˜jℓ =
∑
i=1 πiUi j
r 2iℓ
R¯j (R¯j+riℓ ) .
We claim that Vt ≥ 0 for each t and {V˜t } is a summable se-
quence almost surely. Then, from (18) and Theorem 4.2, we get that
{ut } converges almost surely and it completes the proof. Next, we
validate our claims.
We first show thatVt ≥ 0,∀t . Note thatD is a row-stochastic ma-
trix and hence,
∑o
ℓ=1 D jℓ = 1. Therefore, by the Jensen’s inequality
[21], we have:
o∑
ℓ=1
D jℓ(yjℓ)2 ≥
o∑
ℓ=1
(D jℓyjℓ)2.
Hence, V ≥ 0.
We next claim that {V˜t } is a summable sequence with probability
one. It can be observed from (19) that
Vt ≤
o∑
j=1
o2n
R¯2j
. (20)
since yjℓ ≤ 1, z˜jℓ ≤ R¯−2j for each j ∈ [n], ℓ ∈ [m] and D is a
row-stochastic matrix. To prove the claim, it suffices to show that
for each j ∈ [m], the sequence { 1
R2j (t )
} is summable. Note that for
each j ∈ [m] and for each t , we have R¯j (t + 1) = R¯j (t) + ϵt where
ϵt ≥ ϵ > 0 with probability pt ≥ p > 0. Therefore, using the
Borel-Cantelli Lemma for adapted processes [21] we have { 1
R2j (t )
}
is summable which concludes the proof. □
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The above result implies that the effectiveness of the DBMS,
stochastically speaking, increases as time progresses when the
learning rule in Section 4 is utilized. Not only that, but this property
does not depend on the choice of the effectiveness function (i.e. riℓ
in this case). This is indeed a desirable property for any adapting
scheme for DBMS adaptation.
4.3 User Adaptation
Here, we consider the case that the user also adapts to the DBMS’s
strategy. When the user submits a query q and the DBMS returns a
result that fully satisfy the intent behind the query e , it is relatively
more likely that the user will use the query q to express e again
during her interaction with the DBMS. On the other hand, if the
DBMS returns a result that does not contain any tuple that is rele-
vant to the e , it less likely that the user expresses e using q in future.
In fact, researchers have observed that users show reinforcement
learning behavior when interacting with a DBMS over a period of
time [10]. In particular, the authors in [10] have shown that some
groups of users learned to formulate queries with a model similar
to Roth-Erev reinforcement learning. We define the similarity mea-
sure as follows. For simplicity we assume thatm = o and use the
following similarity measure:
riℓ =
{
1 if i = ℓ,
0 otherwise .
In this case, we assume that the user adapts to the DBMS strategy
at time steps 0 < t1 < · · · < tk < · · · and in those time-steps
the DBMS is not adapting as there is no reason to assume the
synchronicity between the user and the DBMS. The reinforcement
learning mechanism for the user is as follows:
a. Let S(0) > 0 be anm×n reward matrix whose entries are strictly
positive.
b. Let U (0) be the initial user’s strategy with
Ui j (0) =
Si j (0)∑n
j′=1 Si j′(0)
for all i ∈ [m] and j ∈ [n]. and let U (tk ) = U (tk − 1) = · · · =
U (tk−1 + 1) for all k .
c. For all k ≥ 1, do the following:
i. The nature picks a random intent t ∈ [m] with probability
πi (independent of the earlier choices of the nature) and the
user picks a query j ∈ [n] with probability
P(q(tk ) = j | i(tk ) = i) = Ui j (tk ).
ii. The DBMS uses the current strategy D(tk ) and interpret the
query by the intent i ′(t) = i ′ with probability
U (i ′(tk ) = i ′ | q(tk ) = j) = D ji′(tk ).
iii. User gives a reward 1 if i = i ′ and otherwise, gives no
rewards, i.e.
S+i j =
{
Si j (tk ) + 1 if j = q(tk ) and i(tk ) = i ′(tk )
Si j (tk ) otherwise
where S+i j = Si j (tk + 1).
iv. Update the user’s strategy by
Ui j (tk + 1) =
Uji (tk + 1)∑n
j′=1 Si j′(tk + 1)
, (21)
for all i ∈ [m] and j ∈ [n].
In the above scheme S(t) is the reward matrix at time t for the
user.
4.4 Analysis of User and DBMS Adaptation
In this section, we provide an analysis of the reinforcement mecha-
nism provided above and will show that, statistically speaking, our
proposed adaptation rule for DBMS, even when the user adapts,
leads to improvement of the efficiency of the interaction. With a
slight abuse of notation, let
u(t) := ur (U ,D(t)) = ur (U (t),D(t)), (22)
for an effectiveness measure r as ur is defined in (1).
Lemma 4.4. Let t = tk for some k ∈ N. Then, for any i ∈ [m] and
j ∈ [n], we have
E(U +i j | Ft ) −Ui j =
πiUi j∑n
ℓ=1 Siℓ + 1
(D ji − ui (t)) (23)
where
ui (t) =
n∑
j=1
Ui j (t)D ji (t).
Proof. Fix i ∈ [m], j ∈ [n] and k ∈ N. Let B be the event that
at the tk ’th iteration, user reinforces a pair (i, ℓ) for some ℓ ∈ [n].
Then, on the complement Bc of B, P+i j (ω) = Pi j (ω). Let B1 ⊆ B be
the subset of B such that the pair (i, j) is reinforced and B2 = B \B1
be the event that some other pair (i, ℓ) is reinforced for ℓ , i .
We note that
U +i j =
Si j + 1∑n
ℓ=1 Siℓ + 1
1B1 +
Si j∑n
ℓ=1 Siℓ + 1
1B2 +Ui j1Bc .
Therefore, we have
E(U +i j | Fkt ) = πiUi jD ji
Si j + 1∑n
ℓ=1 Siℓ + 1
+
∑
ℓ,j
πiUiℓDℓi
Si j∑n
ℓ′=1 Siℓ′ + 1
+ (1 − p)Ui j ,
where p = U (B | Fkt ) =
∑
ℓ πiUi jD ji . Note thatUi j =
Si j∑n
ℓ=1 Siℓ
and
hence,
E(U +i j | Ft ) −Ui j =
1∑n
ℓ′=1 Siℓ′ + 1
(
πiUi jD ji − πiUi j
∑
ℓ
UiℓDℓi
)
.
which can be rewritten as in (23). □
Using Lemma 4.1, we show that the process {u(t)} is a sub-
martingale.
Theorem 4.5. Let t = tk for some k ∈ N. Then, we have
E(u(t + 1) | Ft ) − u(t) ≥ 0 (24)
where u(t) is given by (22).
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Proof. Fix t = tk for some k ∈ N. Let u+ := u(t + 1), u := u(t),
ui := ui (U (t),D(t)) and also define S˜i := ∑m
ℓ′=1 Siℓ′ + 1. Then,
using the linearity of conditional expectation and Lemma 4.1, we
have:
E(u+ | Ft ) − u =
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
πiD ji
(
E(U +i j | Ft ) −Ui j
)
=
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
πiD ji
πiUi j∑m
ℓ′=1 Sjℓ′ + 1
(
D ji − ui
)
=
m∑
i=1
π 2i
S˜i
©­«
n∑
j=1
Ui j (D ji )2 − (ui )2ª®¬ . (25)
Note that U is a row-stochastic matrix and hence,
∑m
i=1Ui j = 1.
Therefore, by the Jensen’s inequality [21], we have:
n∑
j=1
Ui j (D ji )2 ≥ ©­«
n∑
j=1
D jiUi j
ª®¬
2
= (ui )2.
Replacing this in the right-hand-side of (25), we conclude that
E(u+ | Ft )−u ≥ 0 and hence, the sequence {u(t)} is a submartingale.
□
Corollary 4.6. The sequence {u(t)} given by (14) converges al-
most surely.
Proof. Note from Theorem 4.3 and 4.5 that the sequence {u(t)}
satisfies all the conditions of Theorem 4.2. Hence, proven. □
5 EFFICIENT QUERY ANSWERING OVER
RELATIONAL DATABASES
An efficient implementation of the algorithm proposed in Section 4
over large relational databases poses two challenges. First, since the
set of possible interpretations and their results for a given query
is enormous, one has to find efficient ways of maintaining users’
reinforcements and updating DBMS strategy. Second, keyword and
other usable query interfaces over databases normally return the
top-k tuples according to some scoring functions [15, 32]. Due to
a series of seminal works by database researchers [24], there are
efficient algorithms to find such a list of answers. Nevertheless,
our reinforcement learning algorithm uses a randomized semantic
for answering algorithms in which candidate tuples are associ-
ated a probability for each query that reflects the likelihood by
which it satisfies the intent behind the query. The tuples must be
returned randomly according to their associated probabilities. Us-
ing (weighted) sampling to answer SQL queries with aggregation
functions approximately and efficiently is an active research area
[13, 35]. However, there has not been any attempt on using a ran-
domized strategy to answer so-called point queries over relational
data and achieve a balanced exploitation-exploration trade-off effi-
ciently.
5.1 Maintaining DBMS Strategy
5.1.1 Keyword Query Interface. We use the current architec-
ture of keyword query interfaces over relational databases that
directly use schema information to interpret the input keyword
query [15]. A notable example of such systems is IR-Style [32].
As it is mentioned in Section 2.4, given a keyword query, these
systems translate the input query to a Select-Project-Join query
whose where clause contains functionmatch. The results of these
interpretations are computed, scored according to some ranking
function, and are returned to the user. We provide an overview of
the basic concepts of such a system. We refer the reader to [15, 32]
for more explanation.
5.1.2 Tuple-set: Given keyword query q, a tuple-set is a set of
tuples in a base relation that contain some terms in q. After receiv-
ing q, the query interface uses an inverted index to compute a set
of tuple-sets. For instance, consider a database of products with
relations Product(pid, name), Customer(cid, name), and ProductCus-
tomer(pid, cid) where pid and cid are numeric strings. Given query
iMac John, the query interface returns a tuple-set from Product and
a tuple-set from Customer that match at least one term in the query.
The query interface may also use a scoring function, e.g., traditional
TF-IDF text matching score, to measure how exactly each tuple in
a tuple-set matches some terms in q.
5.1.3 Candidate Network: A candidate network is a join expres-
sion that connects the tuple-sets via primary key-foreign key rela-
tionships. A candidate network joins the tuples in different tuple-
sets and produces joint tuples that contain the terms in the input
keyword query. One may consider the candidate network as a join
tree expression whose leafs are tuple-sets. For instance, one candi-
date network for the aforementioned database of products is Product
▷◁ ProductCustomer ▷◁ Customer. To connect tuple-sets via primary
key-foreign key links, a candidate network may include base re-
lations whose tuples may not contain any term in the query, e.g.,
ProductCustomer in the preceding example. Given a set of tuple-sets,
the query interface uses the schema of the database and progres-
sively generates candidate networks that can join the tuple-sets.
For efficiency considerations, keyword query interfaces limit the
number of relations in a candidate network to be lower than a given
threshold. For each candidate network, the query interface runs a
SQL query and return its results to the users.There are algorithms
to reduce the running time of this stage, e.g., run only the SQL
queries guaranteed to produce top-k tuples [32]. Keyword query
interfaces normally compute the score of joint tuples by summing
up the scores of their constructing tuples multiplied by the inverse
of the number of relations in the candidate network to penalize
long joins. We use the same scoring scheme. We also consider each
(joint) tuple to be candidate answer to the query if it contains at
least one term in the query.
5.1.4 Managing Reinforcements. The aforementioned keyword
query interface implements a basic DBMS strategy of mapping
queries to results but it does not leverage users’ feedback and adopts
a deterministic strategy without any exploration. A naive way to
record users’ reinforcement is to maintain a mapping from queries
to tuples and directly record the reinforcements applied to each
pair of query and tuple. In this method, the DBMS has to maintain
the list of all submitted queries and returned tuples. Because many
returned tuples are the joint tuples produced by candidate networks,
it will take an enormous amount of space and is inefficient to update.
Hence, instead of recording reinforcements directly for each pair of
query and tuple, we construct some features for queries and tuples
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and maintain the reinforcement in the constructed feature space.
More precisely, we construct and maintain a set of n-gram features
for each attribute value in the base relations and each input query.
N-grams are contiguous sequences of terms in a text and are widely
used in text analytics and retrieval [46]. In our implementation, we
use up to 3-gram features to model the challenges in managing a
large set of features. Each feature in every attribute value in the
database has its associated attribute and relation names to reflect the
structure of the data. We maintain a reinforcement mapping from
query features to tuple features. After a tuple gets reinforced by
the user for an input query, our system increases the reinforcement
value for the Cartesian product of the features in the query and
the ones in the reinforced tuple. According to our experiments in
Section 6, this reinforcement mapping can be efficiently maintained
in the main memory by only a modest space overhead.
Given an input query q, our system computes the score of each
tuple t in every tuple-set using the reinforcement mapping: it finds
the n-gram features in t and q and sums up their reinforcement
values recorded in the reinforcement mapping. Our system may use
a weighted combination of this reinforcement score and traditional
text matching score, e.g., TF-IDF score, to compute the final score.
One may also weight each tuple feature proportional to its inverse
frequency in the database similar to some traditional relevance
feedback models [46]. Due to the space limit, we mainly focus on
developing an efficient implementation of query answering based
on reinforcement learning over relational databases and leave us-
ing more advanced scoring methods for future work. The scores of
joint tuples are computed as it is explained in Section 5.1.1. We will
explain in Section 5.2, how we convert these scores to probabilities
and return tuples. Using features to compute and record user feed-
back has also the advantage of using the reinforcement of a pair of
query and tuple to compute the relevance score of other tuples for
other queries that share some features. Hence, reinforcement for
one query can be used to return more relevant answers to other
queries.
5.2 Efficient Exploitation & Exploration
We propose the following two algorithms to generate a weighted
random sample of size k over all candidate tuples for a query.
5.2.1 Reservoir. To provide a random sample, one may calculate
the total scores of all candidate answers to compute their sampling
probabilities. Because this value is not known beforehand, one may
use weighted reservoir sampling [14] to deliver a random sample
without knowing the total score of candidate answers in a single
scan of the data as follows.
Reservoir generates the list of answers only after computing the
results of all candidate networks, therefore, users have to wait for
a long time to see any result. It also computes the results of all
candidate networks by performing their joins fully, which may be
inefficient. We propose the following optimizations to improve its
efficiency and reduce the users’ waiting time.
5.2.2 Poisson-Olken. Poisson-Olken algorithm uses Poisson sam-
pling to output progressively the selected tuples as it processes
each candidate network. It selects the tuple t with probability Sc(t )M ,
where M is an upper bound to the total scores of all candidate
Algorithm 1 Reservoir
W ← 0
Initialize reservoir array A[k]to kdummy tuples.
for all candidate network CN do
for all t ∈ CN do
if A has dummy values then
insert k copies of t into A
else
W ←W + Sc(t)
for all i = 1 ∈ k do
insert t into A[i] with probability Sc(t )W
answers. To computeM , we use the following heuristic. Given can-
didate network CN , we get the upper bound for the total score
of all tuples generated from CN :MCN = 1n (
∑
TS ∈CN Scmax (TS))
1
2ΠTS ∈CN |TS | in which Scmax (TS) is the maximum query score
of tuples in the tuple-set TS and |TS | is the size of each tuple-set.
The term 1n (
∑
TS ∈CN Scmax (TS)) is an upper bound to the scores
of tuples generated byCN . Since each tuple generated byCN must
contain one tuple from each tuple-set inCN , the maximum number
of tuples in CN is ΠTS ∈CN |TS |. It is very unlikely that all tuples
of every tuple-set join with all tuples in every other tuple-set in a
candidate network. Hence, we divide this value by 2 to get a more
realistic estimation. We do not consider candidate networks with
cyclic joins, thus, each tuple-set appears at most once in a candi-
date network. The value of M is the sum of the aforementioned
values for all candidate networks with size greater than one and
the total scores of tuples in each tuple-set. Since the scores of tuples
in each tuple-set is kept in the main memory, the maximum and
total scores and the size of each tuple-set is computed efficiently
before computing the results of any candidate network.
Both Reservoir and the aforementioned Poisson sampling com-
pute the full joins of each candidate network and then sample the
output. This may take a long time particularly for candidate net-
works with some base relations. There are several join sampling
methods that compute a sample of a join by joining only samples
the input tables and avoid computing the full join [14, 37, 50]. To
sample the results of join R1 ▷◁ R2, most of these methods must
know some statistics, such as the number of tuples in R2 that join
with each tuple in R1, before performing the join. They precompute
these statistics in a preprocessing step for each base relation. But,
since R1 and/or R2 in our candidate networks may be tuples sets,
one cannot know the aforementioned statistics unless one performs
the full join.
However, the join sampling algorithm proposed by Olken [50]
finds a random sample of the join without the need to precompute
these statistics. Given join R1 ▷◁ R2, let t⋊R2 denote the set of tuples
in R2 that join with t ∈ R1, i.e., the right semi-join of t and R2. Also,
let |t ⋊ R2 |t ∈R1max be the maximum number of tuples in R2 that join
with a single tuple t ∈ R1. The Olken algorithm first randomly
picks a tuple t1 from R1. It then randomly selects the tuple t2 from
t1 ⋊R2. It accepts the joint tuple t1 ▷◁ t2 with probability |t1⋊R2 ||t⋊R2 |t∈R1max
and rejects it with the remaining probability. To avoid scanning R2
multiple times, Olken algorithm needs an index over R2. Since the
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joins in our candidate networks are over only primary and foreign
keys, we do not need too many indexes to implement this approach.
We extend the Olken algorithm to sample the results of a candi-
date network without doing its joins fully as follows. Given can-
didate network R1 ▷◁ R2, our algorithm randomly samples tuple
t1 ∈ R1 with probability Sc(t1)∑
t∈R1 (Sc(t ))
, where Sc(t) is the score of
tuple t , if R1 is a tuple-set. Otherwise, if R1 is a base relation, it picks
the tuple with probability 1|R1 | . The value of
∑
t ∈R (Sc(t)) for each
tuple set R is computed at the beginning of the query processing
and the value of |R | for each base relation is calculated in a pre-
processing step. The algorithm then samples tuple t2 from t1 ⋊ R2
with probability Sc(t2)∑
t∈t1⋊R2 (Sc(t ))
if R2 is a tuple-set and 1|t1⋊R2 | if
R2 is a base relation. It accepts the joint tuple with probability∑
t∈t1⋊R2 Sc(t )
max (∑t∈s⋊R2,s∈R1 Sc(t )) and rejects it with the remaining probability.
To compute the exact value of max (∑t ∈s⋊R2,s ∈R1 Sc(t)), one
has to perform the full join of R1 and R2. Hence, we use an up-
per bound on max (∑t ∈s⋊R2,s ∈R1 Sc(t)) in Olken algorithm. Using
an upper bound for this value, Olken algorithm produces a cor-
rect random sample but it may reject a larger number of tuples
and generate a smaller number of samples. To compute an upper
bound on the value of max (∑t ∈s⋊R2,s ∈R1 Sc(t)), we precompute
the value of |t ⋊ Bi |t ∈Bjmax before the query time for all base relations
Bi and Bj with primary and foreign keys of the same domain of
values. Assume that B1 and B2 are the base relations of tuple-sets R1
and R2, respectively. We have |t ⋊ R2 |t ∈R1max ≤ |t ⋊ B2 |t ∈B1max . Because
max (∑t ∈s⋊R2,s ∈R1 Sc(t)) ≤ maxt ∈R2 (Sc(t))|t ⋊ R2 |t ∈R1max , we have
max (∑t ∈s⋊R2,s ∈R1 Sc(t)) ≤ maxt ∈R2 (Sc(t))|t ⋊B2 |t ∈B1max . Hence, we
use
∑
t∈t1⋊R2 Sc(t )
maxt∈R2 (Sc(t )) |t⋊B2 |
t∈B1
max
for the probability of acceptance. We
iteratively apply the aforementioned algorithm to candidate net-
works with multiple joins by treating the join of each two relations
as the first relation for the subsequent join in the network.
The following algorithm adopts a Poisson sampling method to
return a sample of sizek over all candidate networks using the afore-
mentioned join sampling algorithm. We show binomial distribution
with parameters n and p as B(n,p). We denote the aforementioned
join algorithm as Extended-Olken. Also, ApproxTotalScore denotes
the approximated value of total score computed as explained at the
beginning of this section.
The expected value of produced tuples in the Poisson-Olken al-
gorithm is close to k . However, as opposed to reservoir sampling,
there is a non-zero probability that Poisson-Olkenmay deliver fewer
than k tuples. To drastically reduce this chance, one may use a
larger value for k in the algorithm and reject the appropriate num-
ber of the resulting tuples after the algorithm terminates [14]. The
resulting algorithm will not progressively produce the sampled
tuples, but, as our empirical study in Section 6 indicates, it is faster
than Reservoir over large databases with relatively many candidate
networks as it does not perform any full join.
Algorithm 2 Poisson-Olken
x ← k
W ← ApproxTotalScorek
while x > 0 do
for all candidate network CN do
if CN is a single tuple-set then
for all t ∈ CN do
output t with probability Sc(t )W
if a tuple t is picked then
x ← x − 1
else
let CN = R1 ▷◁ . . . ▷◁ Rn
for all t ∈ R1 do
Pick value X from distribution B(k, Sc(t )W )
Pipeline X copies of t to the Olken algorithm
if Olken acceptsm tuples then
x ← x −m
6 EMPIRICAL STUDY
6.1 Effectiveness
6.1.1 Experimental Setup. It is difficult to evaluate the effective-
ness of online and reinforcement learning algorithms for informa-
tion systems in a live setting with real users because it requires a
very long time and a large amount of resources [30, 31, 51, 58, 63].
Thus, most studies in this area use purely simulated user inter-
actions [31, 51, 58]. A notable expectation is [63], which uses a
real-world interaction log to simulate a live interaction setting. We
follow a similar approach and use Yahoo! interaction log [64] to
simulate interactions using real-world queries and dataset.
User Strategy Initialization:We train a user strategy over the
Yahoo! 43H-interaction log whose details are in Section 3 using Roth
and Erev’s method, which is deemed the most accurate to model
user learning according to the results of Section 3. This strategy has
341 queries and 151 intents. The Yahoo! interaction log contains user
clicks on the returned intents, i.e. URLs. However, a user may click a
URL by mistake [63]. We consider only the clicks that are not noisy
according to the relevance judgment information that accompanies
the interaction log. According to the empirical study reported in
Section 3.2, the parameters of number and length of sessions and
the amount of time between consecutive sessions do not impact the
user learning mechanism in long-term communications. Thus, we
have not organized the generated interactions into sessions.
Metric: Since almost all returned results have only one relevant
answer and the relevant answers to all queries have the same level
of relevance, we measure the effectiveness of the algorithms using
the standard metric of Reciprocal Rank (RR) [46]. RR is 1r where r
is the position of the first relevant answer to the query in the list of
the returned answers. RR is particularly useful where each query
in the workload has a very few relevant answers in the returned
results, which is the case for the queries used in our experiment.
Algorithms:We compare the algorithm introduced in Section 4.1
against the state-of-the-art and popular algorithm for online learn-
ing in information retrieval called UCB-1 [4, 47, 51, 63]. It has been
shown to outperform its competitors in several studies [47, 51].
It calculates a score for an intent e given the tth submission of
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query q as: Scoret (q, e) = Wq,e,tXq,e,t + α
√
2ln t
Xq,e,t , in which X is how
many times an intent was shown to the user,W is how many times
the user selects a returned intent, and α is the exploration rate set
between [0, 1]. The first term in the formula prefers the intents that
have received relatively more positive feedback, i.e., exploitation,
and the second term gives higher scores to the intents that have
been shown to the user less often and/or have not been tried for
a relatively long time, i.e., exploration. UCB-1 assumes that users
follow a fixed probabilistic strategy. Thus, its goal is to find the
fixed but unknown expectation of the relevance of an intent to
the input query, which is roughly the first term in the formula; by
minimizing the number of unsuccessful trials.
Parameter Estimation:We randomly select 50% of the intents
in the trained user strategy to learn the exploration parameter α
in UCB-1 using grid search and sum of squared errors over 10,000
interactions that are after the interactions in the 43H-interaction
log. We do not use these intents to compare algorithms in our
simulation. We calculate the prior probabilities, π in Equation 1,
for the intents in the trained user strategy that are not used to find
the parameter of UCB-1 using the entire Yahoo! interaction log.
DBMS Strategy Initialization: The DBMS starts the interac-
tion with an strategy that does not have any query. Thus, the DBMS
is not aware of the set of submitted queries apriori. When the DBMS
sees a query for the first time, it stores the query in its strategy, as-
signs equal probabilities for all intents to be returned for this query,
returns some intent(s) to answer the query, and stores the user feed-
back on the returned intent(s) in the DBMS strategy. If the DBMS
has already encountered the query, it leverages the previous user’s
feedback on the results of this query and returns the set of intents
for this query using our proposed learning algorithm. Retrieval sys-
tems that leverage online learning perform some filtering over the
initial set of answers to make efficient and effective exploration pos-
sible [31, 63]. More precisely, to reduce the set of alternatives over
a large dataset, online and reinforcement learning algorithms apply
a traditional selection algorithm to reduce the number of possible
intents to a manageable size. Otherwise, the learning algorithm
has to explore and solicit user feedback on numerous items, which
takes a very long time. For instance, online learning algorithms
used in searching a set of documents, e.g., UCB-1, use traditional in-
formation retrieval algorithms to filter out obviously non-relevant
answers to the input query, e.g., the documents with low TF-IDF
scores. Then, they apply the exploitation-exploration paradigm and
solicit user feedback on the remaining candidate answers. The Ya-
hoo! interaction workload has all queries and intents anonymized,
thus we are unable to perform a filtering method of our own choos-
ing. Hence, we use the entire collection of possible intents in the
portion of the Yahoo! query log used for our simulation. This way,
there 4521 intent per query that can be returned, which is close to
the number of answers a reinforcement learning algorithm may
consider over a large data set after filtering [63]. The DBMS strategy
for our method is initialized to be completely random.
6.1.2 Results. We simulate the interaction of a user population
that starts with our trained user strategy with UCB-1 and our algo-
rithm. In each interaction, an intent is randomly picked from the set
of intents in the user strategy by its prior probability and submitted
to UCB-1 and our method. Afterwards, each algorithm returns a
list of 10 answers and the user clicks on the top-ranked answer
that is relevant to the query according to the relevance judgment
information. We run our simulations for one million interactions.
Figure 2 shows the accumulated Mean Reciprocal Rank (MRR)
over all queries in the simulated interactions. Our method delivers
a higher MRR than UCB-1 and its MRR keeps improving over the
duration of the interaction. UCB-1, however, increases the MRR at
a much slower rate. Since UCB-1 is developed for the case where
users do not change their strategies, it learns and commits to a
fixed probabilistic mapping of queries to intents quite early in the
interaction. Hence, it cannot learn as effectively as our algorithm
where users modify their strategies using a randomized method,
such as Roth and Erev’s. As our method is more exploratory than
UCB-1, it enables users to provide feedback on more varieties of
intents than they do for UCB-1. This enables our method to learn
more accurately how users express their intents in the long-run.
We have also observed that our method allows users to try more
varieties of queries to express an intent and learn the one(s) that
convey the intent effectively. As UCB-1 commits to a certain map-
ping of a query to an intent early in the interaction, it may not
return sufficiently many relevant answers if the user tries this
query to express another intent. This new mapping, however, could
be promising in the long-run. Hence, the user and UCB-1 strategies
may stabilize in less than desirable states. Since our method does
not commit to a fixed strategy that early, users may try this query
for another intent and reinforce the mapping if they get relevant
answers. Thus, users have more chances to try and pick a query for
an intent that will be learned and mapped effectively to the intent
by the DBMS.
For example, suppose the user has a strategy with two intents
and two queries. The user is able to learn from their interactions
with the database system. The DBMS strategy also has two intents
and two queries and is learning with either UCB-1 or Roth and
Erev. The user has been submitting both queries for a single intent
for some time. Thus, UCB-1 has learned to return only that single
intent when it receives either query. However, when the user does
decide to query for its second intent, it is unlikely that UCB-1 will
return the second intent. This is due to the fact that UCB-1 commits
to a particular strategy quite soon and has difficulty adjusting to
a user strategy that changes over time. Roth and Erev, however,
changes its strategy at a more gradual rate. Thus, even after some
time interacting with the user, it will explore and have a much
higher chance at adapting to the changing user strategy.
Because our proposed learning algorithm is more exploratory
than UCB-1, it may have a longer startup period than UCB-1’s.
One may pretrain the DBMS strategy using a sample of previously
collected user interactions to mitigate this lengthy startup period
and improve the effectiveness of answering users’ queries in the
initial interactions. Such an approach has been used in the context
of online learning for document search engines. Another method is
for the DBMS to use a less exploratory learning algorithm, such as
UCB-1, at the beginning of the interaction. After a certain number
of interactions, the DBMS can switch to our proposed learning
algorithm. The DBMS can distinguish the time of switching to our
algorithm by observing the amount of positive reinforcement it
receives from the user. If the user does not provide any or very small
number of positive feedback on the returned results, the DBMS is
14
Figure 2: Mean reciprocal rank for 1,000,000 interactions
not yet ready to switch to a relatively more exploratory algorithm.
If the DBMS observes a relatively large number of positive feedback
on sufficiently many queries, it has already provided a relatively
accurate answers to many queries. Hence, users may be willing
to work with a more exploratory DBMS learning algorithm to
discover more relevant answers to their queries. Finally, one may
use a relatively large value of reinforcement in the database learning
algorithm at the beginning of the interaction to reduce its degree
of exploration. The DBMS may switch to a relatively small value
of reinforcement after it observes positive feedback on sufficiently
many queries.
We have implemented the latter of these methods by increasing
the value of reinforcement by some factor. Figure 3 shows the re-
sults of applying this technique in our proposed DBMS learning
algorithm over the Yahoo! query workload. The value of reinforce-
ment is initially 3 and 6 times larger than the default value proposed
in Section 4 until a threshold satisfaction value is reached, at which
point the reinforcement values scales back down to its original rate.
Figure 3: Mean reciprocal rank for 1,000,000 interactions
with different degrees of reinforcements
We notice that by increasing the reinforcement value by some
factor, the startup period is reduced. However, there are some draw-
backs to this method. Although we don’t see it here, by increasing
the rate of reinforcement in the beginning, some amount of ex-
ploration may be sacrificed. Thus more exploitation will occur in
the beginning of the series of interactions. This may lead to behav-
ior similar to UCB-1 and perform too much exploitation and not
enough exploration. Finding the correct degree of reinforcement is
an interesting area for future work.
6.2 Efficiency
6.2.1 Experimental Setup. Databases and Queries: We have
built two databases from Freebase (developers.google.com/freebase), TV-
Program and Play. TV-Program contains 7 tables and consisting
of 291,026 tuples. Play contains 3 tables and consisting of 8,685
tuples. For our queries, we have used two samples of 621 (459
unique) and 221 (141 unique) queries from Bing (bing.com) query
log whose relevant answers after filtering our noisy clicks, are in
TV-program and Play databases, respectively [22]. After submitting
each query and getting some results, we simulate user feedback
using the relevance information in the Bing log.
Play: Play contains 3 tables, illustrated in table 8. Fbid is the
identifier for which tuple this is. We use it to determine whether
the user was looking for this tuple when they entered a query.
Table Name Attributes
tbl_play id, fbid, name, description
tbl_genre id, fbid, name, description
tbl_play_genre id, tbl_play_id, tbl_genre_id
Table 8: Play Database Schema
TVProgram:TV Program contains 7 tables, illustrated in table 9.
Fbid is is the same as in the Play database.
Table Name Attributes
tbl_tv_program id, fbid, name, description
tbl_tv_program_tv_actor id, tbl_tv_program_id,
tbl_tv_actor_id
tbl_tv_actor id, fbid, name, description
tbl_tv_program_tv_genre id, tbl_tv_program_id,
tbl_tv_genre_id
tbl_tv_genre id, fbid, name, description
tbl_tv_program_tv_subject id, tbl_tv_program_id,
tbl_tv_subject_id
tbl_tv_subject id, fbid, name, description
Table 9: Play Database Schema
Query Processing:We have used Whoosh inverted index
(whoosh.readthedocs.io) to index each table in databases. Whoosh
recognizes the concept of table with multiple attributes, but cannot
perform joins between different tables. Because the Poisson-Olken
algorithmneeds indexes over primary and foreign keys used to build
candidate network, we have build hash indexes over these tables
15
in Whoosh. Given an index-key, these indexes return the tuple(s)
that match these keys inside Whoosh. To provide a fair comparison
between Reservoir and Poisson-Olken, we have used these indexes to
perform join for bothmethods.We also precompute andmaintain all
3-grams of the tuples in each database as mentioned in Section 5.1.
We have implemented our system using both Reservoir and Poisson
algorithms. We have limited the size of each candidate network to 5.
Our system returns 10 tuples in each interaction for both methods.
Hardware Platform:We run experiments on a server with 32
2.6GHz Intel Xeon E5-2640 processors with 50GB of main memory.
6.2.2 Results. Table 10 depicts the time for processing candi-
date networks and reporting the results for both Reservoir and
Poisson-Olken over TV-Program and Play databases over 1000 inter-
actions. These results also show that Poisson-Olken is able to signif-
icantly improve the time for executing the joins in the candidate
network, shown as performing joins in the table, over Reservoir in
both databases. The improvement is more significant for the larger
database, TV-Program. Poisson-Olken progressively produces tuples
to show to user. But, we are not able to use this feature for all inter-
actions. For a considerable number of interactions, Poisson-Olken
does not produce 10 tuples, as explained in Section 5.2. Hence, we
have to use a larger value of k and wait for the algorithm to finish
in order to find a randomize sample of the answers as explained
at the end of Section 5.2. Both methods have spent a negligible
amount of time to reinforce the features, which indicate that using
a rich set of features one can perform and manage reinforcement
efficiently.
Table 10: Average candidate networks processing times in
seconds for 1000 interactions
Database Reservoir Poisson-Olken
Play 0.078 0.042
TV Program 0.298 0.171
7 EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
In this section, we formally investigate the eventual stable states
and equilibria of the game. Our analyses hold for every adaptation
and learning algorithms used by the agents in the game and not
only for the methods proposed in this paper.
7.1 Fixed User Strategy
In some settings, the strategy of a user may change in amuch slower
time scale than that of the DBMS. In these cases, it is reasonable to
assume that the user’s strategy is fixed. Hence, the game will reach
a desirable state where the DBMS adapts a strategy that maximizes
the expected payoff. Let a strategy profile be a pair of user and
DBMS strategies.
Definition 7.1. Given a strategy profile (U ,D),D is a best response
toU w.r.t. effectiveness measure r if we have ur (U ,D) ≥ ur (U ,D ′)
for all the database strategies D ′.
A DBMS strategy D is a strict best response toU if the inequality
in Definition 7.1 becomes strict for all D ′ , D.
Example 7.2. Consider the database instance about universities
that is shown in Table 11 and the intents, queries, and the strategy
profiles in Tables 12(a), 12(b), 13(a), and 13(b), respectively. Given a
uniform prior over the intents, the DBMS strategy is a best response
the user strategy w.r.t. w.r.t precision and p@k in both strategy
profiles 13(a) and 13(b).
Table 11: A database instance of relation Univ
Name Abbreviation State Type Rank
Missouri State University MSU MO public 20
Mississippi State University MSU MS public 22
Murray State University MSU KY public 14
Michigan State University MSU MI public 18
Table 12: Intents and Queries
12(a) Intents
Intent# Intent
e1 ans(z) ← Univ(x, ‘MSU ’, ‘MS ’, y, z)
e2 ans(z) ← Univ(x, ‘MSU ’, ‘MI ’, y, z)
e3 ans(z) ← Univ(x, ‘MSU ’, ‘MO ’, y, z)
12(b) Queries
Query# Query
q1 ‘MSU MI’
q2 ‘MSU’
Table 13: Two strategy profiles over the intents and queries
in Table 12. User and DBMS strategies at the top and bottom,
respectively.
13(a) A strategy profile
q1 q2
e1 0 1
e2 0 1
e3 0 1
e1 e2 e3
q1 0 1 0
q2 0 1 0
13(b) Another strategy profile
q1 q2
e1 0 1
e2 1 0
e3 0 1
e1 e2 e3
q1 0 1 0
q2 0.5 0 0.5
Definition 7.3. Given a strategy profile (U ,D), an intent ei , and
a query qj , the payoff of ei using qj is
ur (ei ,qj ) =
o∑
ℓ=1
D j, ℓr (ei , sℓ).
Definition 7.4. The pool of intents for query qj in user strategy
U is the set of intents ei such thatUi, j > 0.
We denote the pool of intents of qj as PL(qj ). Our definition of
pool of intent resembles the notion of pool of state in signaling
games [16, 20]. Each result sℓ such that D j, ℓ > 0 may be returned
in response to query qj . We call the set of these results the reply to
query qj .
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Definition 7.5. A best reply to query qj w.r.t. effectiveness mea-
sure r is a reply that maximizes
∑
ei ∈PL(qj ) πiUi, j ur (ei ,qj ).
The following characterizes the best response to a strategy.
Lemma 7.6. Given a strategy profile (U ,D), D is a best response to
U w.r.t. effectiveness measure r if and only if D maps every query to
one of its best replies.
Proof. If each query is assigned to its best reply in D, no im-
provement in the expected payoff is possible, thus D is a best re-
sponse forU . Let D be a best response forU such that some query
q is not mapped to its best reply in D. Let rmax be a best reply for
q. We create a DBMS strategy D ′ , D such that all queries q′ , q
in D ′ have the same reply as they have in D and the reply of q is
rmax . Clearly, D ′ has higher payoff than D forU . Thus, D is not a
best response. □
The following corollary directly results from Lemma 7.6.
Corollary 7.7. Given a strategy profile (U ,D), D is a strict best
response to U w.r.t. effectiveness measure r if and only if every query
has one and only one best reply and D maps each query to its best
reply.
Given an intent e over database instance I , some effectiveness
measures, such as precision, take their maximum for other results
in addition to e(I ). For example, given intent e , the precision of
every non-empty result s ⊂ e(I ) is equal to the precision of e(I )
for e . Hence, there are more than one best reply for an intent w.r.t.
precision. Thus, according to Corollary 7.7, there is not any strict
best response w.r.t. precision.
7.2 Nash Equilibrium
In this section and Section 7.3, we analyze the equilibria of the
game where both user and DBMS may modify their strategies. A
Nash equilibrium for a game is a strategy profile where the DBMS
and user will not do better by unilaterally deviating from their
strategies.
Definition 7.8. A strategy profile (U ,D) is a Nash equilibrium
w.r.t. a satisfaction function r if ur (U ,D) ≥ ur (U ′,D) for all user
strategyU ′ and ur (U ,D) ≥ ur (U ,D ′) for all database strategy D ′.
Example 7.9. Consider again the database about universities that
is shown in Table 11 and the intents, queries, and the strategy
profiles in Tables 12(a), 12(b), 13(a), and 13(b), respectively. Both
strategy profiles 13(a) and 13(b) are Nash equilibria w.r.t precision
and p@k . User and DBMS cannot unilaterally change their strate-
gies and receive a better payoff. If one modifies the strategy of the
database in strategy profile 13(b) and replaces the probability of
executing and returning e1 and e3 given query q2 to ϵ and 1 − ϵ ,
0 ≤ ϵ ≤ 1, the resulting strategy profiles are all Nash equilibria.
Intuitively, the concept of Nash equilibrium captures the fact that
users may explore different ways of articulating and interpreting
intents, but they may not be able to look ahead beyond the payoff of
a single interaction when adapting their strategies. Some users may
be willing to lose some payoff in the short-term to gain more payoff
in the long run, therefore, an interesting direction is to define and
analyze less myopic equilibria for the game [26].
If the interaction between user and DBMS reaches a Nash equi-
librium, they user do not have a strong incentive to change her
strategy. As a result the strategy of the DBMS and the expected
payoff of the game will likely to remain unchanged. Hence, in a
Nash equilibrium the strategies of user and DBMS are likely to be
stable. Also, the payoff at a Nash equilibrium reflects a potential
eventual payoff for the user and DBMS in their interaction. Query
qj is a best query for intent ei if qj ∈ arg maxqk ur (ei ,qk ).
The following lemma characterizes the Nash equilibrium of the
game.
Lemma 7.10. A strategy profile (U ,D) is a Nash equilibrium w.r.t.
effectiveness measure r if and only if
• for every query q, q is a best query for every intent e ∈ PL(q), and
• D is a best response toU .
Proof. Assume that (U ,D) is a Nash equilibrium. Also, assume
qj is not a best query for ei ∈ PL(qj ). Let qj′ be a best query
for ei . We first consider the case where ur (ei ,qj′) > 0. We build
strategy U ′ where U ′k, ℓ = Uk, ℓ for all entries (k, ℓ) , (i, j) and
(k, ℓ) , (i, j ′), U ′i, j = 0, and U ′i, j′ = Ui, j . We have U ′ , U and
ur (U ,D) < ur (U ′,D). Hence, (U ,D) is not a Nash equilibrium.
Thus, we haveUi, j = 0 and the first condition of the theorem holds.
Now, consider the case where ur (ei ,qj′) = 0. In this case, we will
also have ur (ei ,qj ) = 0, which makes qj a best query for ei . We
prove the necessity of the second condition of the theorem similarly.
This concludes the proof for the necessity part of the theorem. Now,
assume that both conditions of the theorem hold for strategiesU
and D. We can prove that it is not possible to have strategies U ′′
and D ′′ such that ur (U ,D) < ur (U ′′,D) or ur (U ,D) < ur (U ,D ′′)
using a similar method. □
7.3 Strict Nash Equilibrium
A strict Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile in which the DBMS
and user will do worse by unilaterally changing their equilibrium
strategy.
Definition 7.11. A strategy profile (U ,D) is a strict Nash equilib-
rium w.r.t. effectiveness measure r if we have ur (U ,D) > ur (U ,D ′)
for all DBMS strategies D ′ , D and ur (U ,D) > ur (U ′,D) for all
user strategiesU ′ , U .
Table 14: Queries and Intents
14(a) Intents
Intent# Intent
e3 ans(z) ← Univ(x , ‘MSU ’, ‘MO’,y, z)
e4 ans(z) ← Univ(x , ‘MSU ’,y, ‘public’, z)
e5 ans(z) ← Univ(x , ‘MSU ’, ‘KY ’,y, z)
14(b) Queries
Query# Query
q2 ‘MSU’
q3 ‘KY’
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Table 15: Strict best strategy profile
q2 q3
e3 1 0
e4 1 0
e5 0 1
e3 e4 e5
q2 1 0 0
q3 0 0 1
Example 7.12. Consider the intents, queries, strategy profile, and
database instance in Tables 14(a), 14(b), 15, and 11. The strategy
profile is a strict Nash equilibrium w.r.t precision. However, the
strategy profile in Example 7.9 is not a strict Nash equilibrium as
one may modify the value of Dq2,e1 and Dq2,e3 without changing
the payoff of the players.
Next, we investigate the characteristics of strategies in a strict Nash
equilibria profile. Recall that a strategy is pure iff it has only 1 or 0
values. A user strategy is onto if there is not any query qj such that
Ui, j = 0 for all intend i . A DBMS strategy is one-to-one if it does
not map two queries to the same result. In other words, there is not
any result sell such that D jℓ > 0 and D j′ℓ > 0 where j , j ′.
Theorem 7.13. If (U ,D) is a strict Nash equilibrium w.r.t. satis-
faction function r , we have
• U is pure and onto.
• D is pure and one-to-one.
Proof. Let us assume that there is an intent ei and a query qj
such that 0 < Ui, j < 1. SinceU is row stochastic, there is a query
qj′ where 0 < Ui, j′ < 1. Let ur (Ui, j ,D) = ∑oℓ=1 D j, ℓr (ei , sℓ). If
ur (Ui, j ,D) = ur (Ui, j′ ,D), we can create a new user strategy U ′
whereU ′i, j = 1 andU
′
i, j′ = 0 and the values of other entries inU
′ is
the same asU . Note that the payoff of (U ,D) and (U ′,D) are equal
and hence, (U ,D) is not a strict Nash equilibrium.
If ur (Ui, j ,D) , ur (Ui, j′ ,D), without loss of generality one can
assume that ur (Ui, j ,D) > ur (Ui, j′ ,D). We construct a new user
strategyU ′′ whose values for all entries except (i, j) and (i, j ′) are
equal to U and U ′′i, j = 1, U
′′
i, j′ = 0. Because ur (U ,D) < ur (U ′′,D),
(U ,D) is not a strict Nash equilibrium. Hence, U must be a pure
strategy. Similarly, it can be shown that D should be a pure strategy.
If U is not onto, there is a query qj that is not mapped to any
intent inU . Hence, one may change the value in row j of D without
changing the payoff of (U ,D).
Assume that D is not one-to-one. Hence, there are queries qi
and qj and a result sℓ such that Di, ℓ = D j, ℓ = 1. Because (U ,D) is
a strict Nash, U is pure and we have either Ui, ℓ = 1 or Uj, ℓ = 1.
Assume that Ui, ℓ = 1. We can construct strategy U ′ that have
the same values as U for all entries except for (i, ℓ) and (j, ℓ) and
U ′i, ℓ = 0,U
′
j, ℓ = 1. Since the payoffs of (U ,D) and (U ′,D) are equal,
(U ,D) is not a strict Nash equilibrium. □
Theorem 7.13 extends the Theorem 1 in [20] for our model. In
some settings, the user may knows and use fewer queries than
intents, i.e., m > n. Because the DBMS strategy in a strict Nash
equilibrium is one-to-one, the DBMS strategy does not map some
of the results to any query. Hence, the DBMS will never return
some results in a strict Nash equilibrium no matter what query
is submitted. Interestingly, as Example 7.2 suggests some of these
results may be the results that perfectly satisfy some user’s intents.
That is, given intent ei over database instance I , the DBMS may
never return ei (I ) in a strict Nash equilibrium. Using a proof similar
to the one of Lemma 7.10, we have the following properties of strict
Nash equilibria of a game. A strategy profile (U ,D) is a strict Nash
equilibrium w.r.t. effectiveness measure r if and only if:
• Every intent e has a unique best query and the user strategy
maps e to its best query, i.e., e ∈ PL(qi ).
• D is the strict best response toU .
7.4 Number of Equilibria
A natural question is how many (strict) Nash equilibria exist in a
game. Theorem 7.13 guarantees that both user and DBMS strategies
in a strict Nash equilibrium are pure. Thus, given that the sets of
intents and queries are finite, there are finitely many strict Nash
equilibria in the game. We note that each set of results is always
finite. However, we will show that if the sets of intents and queries
in a game are finite, the game has infinite Nash equilibria.
Lemma 7.14. If a game has a non-strict Nash equilibrium. Then
there is an infinitely many Nash equilibria.
Proof. The result follows from the fact that the payoff function
(1) is a bilinear form ofU andD, i.e. it is a linear ofD whenU is fixed
and a linear function ofU , whenD is fixed. If forD , D ′, (U ,D) and
(U ,D ′) are Nash-equilibria, then ur (U ,D) = ur (U ,D ′). Therefore
ur (U ,αD + (1 − α)D ′) = ur (U ,D) for any α ∈ R. In particular,
for α ∈ [0, 1], if D,D ′ are stochastic matrices, αD + (1 − α)D ′
will be a stochastic matrix and hence, (U ,αD + (1 − α)D ′) is a
Nash equilibrium as well. Similarly, if (U ′,D) and (U ,D) are Nash
equilibria forU , U ′, then ur (αU + (1 − α)U ′,D) = ur (U ,D) and
(αU + (1 − α)U ′,D) is a Nash-equilibrium for any α ∈ [0, 1]. □
Theorem 7.15. Given a game with finitely many intents and
queries, if the game has a non-strict Nash equilibrium, it has an
infinite number of Nash equilibria.
Proof. Every finite game has always a mixed Nash equilibrium
[59]. According to Theorem 7.13, a mixed Nash is not a strict Nash
equilibrium. Therefore, using Lemma 7.14, the game will have in-
finitely many Nash equilibria. □
7.5 Efficiency
In this section we discuss the efficiency of different equilibria. We
refer to the value of the utility (payoff) in formula (1) at a strategy
profile to the efficiency of the strategy. Therefore, the most efficient
strategy profile is naturally the one that maximizes (1). We refer to
an equilibria with maximum efficiency as an efficient equilibrium.
Thus far we have discussed two types of equilibria, Nash and
strict Nash, that once reached it is unlikely that either player will
deviate from its current strategy. In some cases it may be possible
to enter a state of equilibria where neither player has any incentive
to deviate, but that equilibria may not be an efficient equilibrium.
The strategy profile in Table 3(b) provides the highest payoff
for the user and DBMS given the intents and queries in Tables 2(a)
and 2(b) over the database in Table 1. However, some Nash equilib-
ria may not provide high payoffs. For instance, Table 3(a) depicts
18
another strategy profile for the set of intents and queries in Ta-
bles 2(a) and 2(b) over the database in Table 1. In this strategy
profile, the user has little knowledge about the database content
and expresses all of her intents using a single query q2, which asks
for the ranking of universities whose abbreviations are MSU. Given
query q2, the DBMS always returns the ranking of Michigan State
University. Obviously, the DBMS always returns the non-relevant
answers for the intents of finding the rankings of Mississippi State
University and Missouri State University. If all intents have equal
prior probabilities, this strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium. For
example, the user will not get a higher payoff by increasing their
knowledge about the database and using query q1 to express intent
e2. Clearly, the payoff of this strategy profile is less than the strat-
egy profile in Table 3(b). Nevertheless, the user and the DBMS do
not have any incentive to leave this undesirable stable state once
reached and will likely stay in this state.
Definition 7.16. A strategy profile (U ,D) is optimal w.r.t. an effec-
tiveness measure r if we have ur (U ,D) ≥ u(U ′,D ′) for all DBMS
strategies D ′ andU ′
Since, the games discussed in this paper are games of identical
interest, i.e. the payoff of the user and the DBMS are the same,
therefore, an optimal strategy (U ,D) (w.r.t. an effectiveness measure
r ) is a Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 7.17. A strategy (U ,D) is optimal if and only if it is an
efficient equilibrium.
Proof. Note that if (U ,D) is optimal, then none of the two play-
ers (i.e. the user and the DBMS) has a unilateral incentive to deviate.
Therefore (U ,D) is a Nash equilibrium. On the other hand, since
the payoff function (1) is a continuous function ofU and D and the
domain of row-stochastic matrices is a compact space, therefore a
maximizer (U ,D) of (1) exists and by the previous part it is a Nash
equilibrium. Note that the efficiency of all strategies are bounded
by the efficiency of an optimal strategy and hence, any efficient
equilibrium is optimal. □
Similar to the analysis on efficiency of a Nash equilibria, there
are strict Nash equilibria that are less efficient than others. Strict
Nash equilibria strategy profiles are unlikely to deviate from the
current strategy profile, since any unilateral deviation will result
in a lower payoff. From this we can say that strict Nash equilibria
are also more stable than Nash equilibria since unilateral deviation
will always have a lower payoff.
Table 16: Strategy Profile 1
16(a) User strategy
q1 q2
e1 0 1
e2 1 0
e3 1 0
16(b) Database strategy
e1 e2 e3
q1 0 0 1
q2 1 0 0
As an example of a strict Nash equilibrium that is not efficient,
consider both strategy profiles illustrated in Tables 16 and 17. Note
that the intents. queries, and results in this example are different
Table 17: Strategy Profile 2
17(a) User Strategy
q1 q2
e1 0 1
e2 0 1
e3 1 0
17(b) Database Strategy
e1 e2 e3
q1 0 0 1
q2 0 1 0
from the ones in the previous examples. For this illustration, we
set the rewards to r (e1, s1) = 1, r (e2, s2) = 2, r (e2, s3) = 0.1, and
r (e3, s3) = 3where all other rewards are 0. Using our payoff function
in Equation 1 we can calculate the total payoff for the strategy
profile in Table 16 as u(U ,D) = 4.1. This strategy profile is a strict
Nash since any unilateral deviation by either player will result in
a strictly worse payoff. Consider the strategy profile in Table 17
with payoff u(U ,D) = 5. This payoff is higher than the payoff the
strategy profile in Table 16 receives. It is also not likely for the
strategy profile with less payoff to change either strategy to the
ones in the strategy profile with higher payoff as both are strict
Nash.
7.6 Limiting Equilibria of the Investigated
Learning Mechanisms
An important immediate direction to be explored is to study the
limiting behavior and equilibria of the game in which the user and
DBMS use the adaptation mechanisms in Section 4. Such questions
are partially addressed in [33] for the case that both the players in
a singling game adapt their strategy synchronously and identically.
In this case, in the limit, only certain equilibria can emerge. In
particular, eventually, either an object, intent in our model, will
be assigned to many signals, queries in our model, (synonyms) or
many intents can be assigned to one query (polysemy). But two
intents will not be assigned to two queries (see Theorem 2.3 in [33]
for more details). The authors in [33] follow a traditional language
game approach as explained in Section 8. Our immediate future
research directions on the study of the adaptation mechanism is to
study the convergence properties of the proposed reinforcement
algorithm in Section 4.1 and Section 4.3. In particular, when the user
is not adapting, does the strategy of the DBMS converge to some
limiting strategy such as is the best response to the user’s strategy?
Also, when both the user and the DBMS adapt to each other, what
equilibria will emerge? We believe that answers to these questions
will significantly contribute to the proposed learning framework in
the database systems and provide a novel theoretical perspective
on the efficiency of a query interface.
8 RELATEDWORK
Query learning: Database community has proposed several sys-
tems that help the DBMS learn the user’s information need by show-
ing examples to the user and collecting her feedback [2, 8, 19, 41, 61].
In these systems, a user explicitly teaches the system by labeling
a set of examples potentially in several steps without getting any
answer to her information need. Thus, the system is broken into
two steps: first it learns the information need of the user by so-
liciting labels on certain examples from the user and then once
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the learning has completed, it suggests a query that may express
the user’s information need. These systems usually leverage active
learning methods to learn the user intent by showing the fewest
possible examples to the user [19]. However, ideally one would like
to have a query interface in which the DBMS learns about the user’s
intents while answering her (vague) queries as our system does.
As opposed to active learning methods, one should combine and
balance exploration and learning with the normal query answering
to build such a system. Thus, we focus on interaction systems that
combine the capabilities of traditional query answering paradigm
and leveraging user feedback. Moreover, current query learning sys-
tems assume that users follow a fixed strategy for expressing their
intents. Also, we focus on the problems that arise in the long-term
interaction that contain more than a single query and intent.
Game-theoreticModels in Information Systems:Game the-
oretic approaches have been used in various areas of computer
science, such as distributed systems, planning, security, and data
mining [3, 27, 28, 39, 45, 54, 56]. Researchers have also leveraged eco-
nomical models to build query interfaces that return desired results
to the users using the fewest possible interactions [66]. In particular,
researchers have recently applied game-theoretic approaches to
model the actions taken by users and document retrieval systems
in a single session [43]. They propose a framework to find out
whether the user likes to continue exploring the current topic or
move to another topic. We, however, explore the development of
common representations of intents between the user and DMBS.
We also investigate the interactions that may contain various ses-
sions and topics. Moreover, we focus on structured rather than
unstructured data. Avestani et al. have used signaling games to
create a shared lexicon between multiple autonomous systems [6].
Our work, however, focuses on modeling users’ information needs
and development of mutual understanding between users and the
DBMS. Moreover, as opposed to the autonomous systems, a DBMS
and user may update their information about the interaction in
different time scales. We also propose novel strategy adaptation
mechanism for the DBMS and efficient algorithms based on this
mechanism over relational data.
Signaling and Language Games: Our game is special case of
signaling games, which model communication between two or
more agents and have been widely used in economics, sociology,
biology, and linguistics [16, 20, 40, 49]. Generally speaking, in a
signaling game a player observes the current state of the world and
informs the other player(s) by sending a signal. The other player in-
terprets the signal and makes a decision and/or performs an action
that affect the payoff of both players. A signaling game may not be
cooperative in which the interests of players do not coincide [16].
Our framework extends a particular category of signaling games
called language games [20, 49, 62] and is closely related to learning
in signaling games [25, 33, 60]. These games have been used to
model the evolution of a population’s language in a shared environ-
ment. In a language game, the strategy of each player is a stochastic
mapping between a set of signals and a set of states. Each player
observes its internal state, picks a signal according to its strategy,
and sends the signal to inform other player(s) about its state. If the
other player(s) interpret the correct state from the sent signal, the
communication is successful and both players will be rewarded.
Our framework differs from language games in several fundamental
aspects. First, in a language game every player signals, but only
one of our players, i.e., user, sends signals. Second, language games
model states as an unstructured set of objects. However, each user’s
intent in our framework is a set of tuples and different intents
may intersect. Third, the signals in language games do not posses
any particular meaning and can be assigned to every state. A data-
base query, however, restricts its possible answers. Finally, there
is not any work on language games on analyzing the dynamics of
reinforcement learning where players learn in different time scales.
The authors in [33] have also analyzed the effectiveness of a
2-player signaling game in which both players use Roth and Erev’s
model for learning. However, they assume that both players learn
at the same time-scale. Our result in this section holds for the case
where users and DBMS learn at different time-scales, which may
arguably be the dominant case in our setting as generally users
may learn in a much slower time-scale compared to the DBMS.
9 CONCLUSION
Many users do not know how to express their information needs.
A DBMS may interact with these users and learn their information
needs. We showed that users learn and modify how they express
their information needs during their interaction with the DBMS
and modeled the interaction between the user and the DBMS as a
game, where the players would like to establish a common mapping
from information needs to queries via learning. As current query
interfaces do not effectively learn the information needs behind
queries in such a setting, we proposed a reinforcement learning
algorithm for the DBMS that learns the querying strategy of the user
effectively. We provided efficient implementations of this learning
mechanisms over large databases.
REFERENCES
[1] Serge Abiteboul, Richard Hull, and Victor Vianu. 1994. Foundations of Databases:
The Logical Level. Addison-Wesley.
[2] Azza Abouzied, Dana Angluin, Christos H. Papadimitriou, Joseph M. Hellerstein,
and Avi Silberschatz. 2013. Learning and verifying quantified boolean queries by
example. In PODS.
[3] I. Abraham, D. Dolev, R. Gonen, and Joseph Halpern. 2006. Distributed computing
meets game theory: robust mechanisms for rational secret sharing and multiparty
computation. In PODC.
[4] Peter Auer, Nicolo Cesa-Bianchi, and Paul Fischer. 2002. Finite-time analysis of
the multiarmed bandit problem. Machine learning 47, 2-3 (2002), 235–256.
[5] Peter Auer, Nicolo Cesa-Bianchi, Yoav Freund, and Robert E Schapire. 2002. The
nonstochastic multiarmed bandit problem. SIAM journal on computing 32, 1
(2002), 48–77.
[6] Paolo Avesani and Marco Cova. 2005. Shared lexicon for distributed annotations
on the Web. In WWW.
[7] J. A. Barrett and K. Zollman. 2008. The Role of Forgetting in the Evolution
and Learning of Language. Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial
Intelligence 21, 4 (2008), 293–309.
[8] Angela Bonifati, Radu Ciucanu, and Slawomir Staworko. 2015. Learning Join
Queries from User Examples. TODS 40, 4 (2015).
[9] Robert R Bush and FrederickMosteller. 1953. A stochastic model with applications
to learning. The Annals of Mathematical Statistics (1953), 559–585.
[10] Yonghua Cen, Liren Gan, and Chen Bai. 2013. Reinforcement Learning in Infor-
mation Searching. Information Research: An International Electronic Journal 18, 1
(2013), n1.
[11] Gloria Chatzopoulou, Magdalini Eirinaki, and Neoklis Polyzotis. 2009. Query
Recommendations for Interactive Database Exploration. In Proceedings of the
21st International Conference on Scientific and Statistical Database Management
(SSDBM 2009). Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg, 3–18. https://doi.org/10.1007/
978-3-642-02279-1_2
[12] Surajit Chaudhuri, Gautam Das, Vagelis Hristidis, and Gerhard Weikum. 2006.
Probabilistic Information Retrieval Approach for Ranking of Database Query
Results. TODS 31, 3 (2006).
20
[13] Surajit Chaudhuri, Bolin Ding, and Srikanth Kandula. 2017. Approximate Query
Processing: No Silver Bullet. In Proceedings of the 2017 ACM International Confer-
ence on Management of Data, SIGMOD Conference 2017, Chicago, IL, USA, May
14-19, 2017. 511–519. https://doi.org/10.1145/3035918.3056097
[14] Surajit Chaudhuri, Rajeev Motwani, and Vivek Narasayya. 1999. On Random
Sampling over Joins. In Proceedings of the 1999 ACM SIGMOD International Con-
ference on Management of Data (SIGMOD ’99). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 263–274.
https://doi.org/10.1145/304182.304206
[15] Yi Chen, Wei Wang, Ziyang Liu, and Xuemin Lin. 2009. Keyword Search on
Structured and Semi-structured Data. In SIGMOD.
[16] I. Cho and D. Kreps. 1987. Signaling games and stable equilibria. Quarterly
Journal of Economics 102 (1987).
[17] John G Cross. 1973. A stochastic learning model of economic behavior. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics 87, 2 (1973), 239–266.
[18] Constantinos Daskalakis, Rafael Frongillo, Christos H. Papadimitriou, George
Pierrakos, and Gregory Valiant. 2010. On Learning Algorithms for Nash
Equilibria. In Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Algorithmic
Game Theory (SAGT’10). Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg, 114–125. http:
//dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1929237.1929248
[19] Kyriaki Dimitriadou, Olga Papaemmanouil, and Yanlei Diao. 2014. Explore-by-
example: An Automatic Query Steering Framework for Interactive Data Explo-
ration. In SIGMOD.
[20] Matina C. Donaldson, Michael Lachmannb, and Carl T. Bergstroma. 2007. The
evolution of functionally referential meaning in a structured world. Journal of
Mathematical Biology 246 (2007).
[21] Rick Durrett. 2010. Probability: theory and examples. Cambridge university press.
[22] Elena Demidova and Xuan Zhou and Irina Oelze and Wolfgang Nejdl. 2010.
Evaluating Evidences for Keyword Query Disambiguation in Entity Centric
Database Search. In DEXA.
[23] Ido Erev and Alvin E Roth. 1995. On the Need for Low Rationality, Gognitive
Game Theory: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed
Strategy Equilibria.
[24] Ronald Fagin, Amnon Lotem, and Moni Naor. 2001. Optimal Aggregation Algo-
rithms for Middleware. In Proceedings of the Twentieth ACM SIGMOD-SIGACT-
SIGART Symposium on Principles of Database Systems (PODS ’01). ACM, New
York, NY, USA, 102–113. https://doi.org/10.1145/375551.375567
[25] Michael J Fox, Behrouz Touri, and Jeff S Shamma. 2015. Dynamics in atomic
signaling games. Journal of theoretical biology 376 (2015).
[26] Arjita Ghosh and Sandip Sen. 2004. Learning TOMs: Towards Non-Myopic
Equilibria. In AAAI.
[27] Giuseppe De Giacomo, , Antonio Di Stasio, Aniello Murano, and Sasha Rubin.
2016. Imperfect information games and generalized planning. In IJCAI.
[28] Georg Gottlob, Nicola Leone, and Francesco Scarcello. 2001. Robbers, Marshals,
and Guards: Game Theoretic and Logical Characterizations of Hypertree Width.
In PODS.
[29] Laura A. Granka, Thorsten Joachims, and Geri Gay. 2004. Eye-tracking Analysis
of User Behavior in WWW Search. In SIGIR.
[30] Artem Grotov and Maarten de Rijke. 2016. Online Learning to Rank for Informa-
tion Retrieval: SIGIR 2016 Tutorial. In Proceedings of the 39th International ACM
SIGIR Conference on Research and Development in Information Retrieval (SIGIR ’16).
ACM, New York, NY, USA, 1215–1218. https://doi.org/10.1145/2911451.2914798
[31] Katja Hofmann, Shimon Whiteson, and Maarten de Rijke. 2013. Balancing ex-
ploration and exploitation in listwise and pairwise online learning to rank for
information retrieval. Information Retrieval 16, 1 (2013), 63–90.
[32] Vagelis Hristidis, Luis Gravano, and Yannis Papakonstantinou. [n. d.]. Efficient
IR-Style Keyword Search over Relational Databases. In VLDB 2003.
[33] Yilei Hu, Brian Skyrms, and Pierre Tarrès. 2011. Reinforcement learning in
signaling game. arXiv preprint arXiv:1103.5818 (2011).
[34] Jeff Huang, Ryen White, and Georg Buscher. 2012. User See, User Point: Gaze
and Cursor Alignment in Web Search. In CHI.
[35] Stratos Idreos, Olga Papaemmanouil, and Surajit Chaudhuri. 2015. Overview of
Data Exploration Techniques. In SIGMOD.
[36] H. V. Jagadish, Adriane Chapman, Aaron Elkiss, Magesh Jayapandian, Yunyao Li,
Arnab Nandi, and Cong Yu. 2007. Making Database Systems Usable. In SIGMOD.
[37] Srikanth Kandula, Anil Shanbhag, Aleksandar Vitorovic, Matthaios Olma, Robert
Grandl, Surajit Chaudhuri, and Bolin Ding. 2016. Quickr: Lazily Approximating
Complex AdHoc Queries in BigData Clusters. In SIGMOD. 631–646. https://doi.
org/10.1145/2882903.2882940
[38] Nodira Khoussainova, YongChul Kwon, Magdalena Balazinska, and Dan Suciu.
2010. SnipSuggest: Context-aware Autocompletion for SQL. PVLDB 4, 1 (2010).
[39] D. Koller and A. Pfeffer. 1995. Generating and solving imperfect information
games. In IJCAI.
[40] David Lewis. 1969. Convention. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
[41] Hao Li, Chee-Yong Chan, and David Maier. 2015. Query From Examples: An
Iterative, Data-Driven Approach to Query Construction. PVLDB 8, 13 (2015).
[42] Erietta Liarou and Stratos Idreos. 2014. dbTouch in action database kernels
for touch-based data exploration. In IEEE 30th International Conference on Data
Engineering, Chicago, ICDE 2014, IL, USA, March 31 - April 4, 2014. 1262–1265.
https://doi.org/10.1109/ICDE.2014.6816756
[43] Jiyun Luo, Sicong Zhang, and Hui Yang. 2014. Win-Win Search: Dual-Agent
Stochastic Game in Session Search. In SIGIR.
[44] Yi Luo, Xumein Lin, Wei Wang, and Xiaofang Zhou. [n. d.]. SPARK: Top-k
Keyword Query in Relational Databases. In SIGMOD 2007.
[45] Qiang Ma, S. Muthukrishnan, Brian Thompson, and Graham Cormode. 2014.
Modeling Collaboration in Academia: AGame Theoretic Approach. In BigScholar.
[46] Christopher Manning, Prabhakar Raghavan, and Hinrich Schutze. 2008. An
Introduction to Information Retrieval. Cambridge University Press.
[47] Taesup Moon, Wei Chu, Lihong Li, Zhaohui Zheng, and Yi Chang. 2012. An
online learning framework for refining recency search results with user click
feedback. ACM Transactions on Information Systems (TOIS) 30, 4 (2012), 20.
[48] Yael Niv. 2009. The Neuroscience of Reinforcement Learning. In ICML.
[49] Martin A Nowak and David C Krakauer. 1999. The evolution of language. PNAS
96, 14 (1999).
[50] Frank Olken. 1993. Random Sampling from Databases. Ph.D. Dissertation. Uni-
versity of California, Berkeley.
[51] Filip Radlinski, Robert Kleinberg, and Thorsten Joachims. 2008. Learning di-
verse rankings with multi-armed bandits. In Proceedings of the 25th international
conference on Machine learning. ACM, 784–791.
[52] Herbert Robbins and David Siegmund. 1985. A convergence theorem for non
negative almost supermartingales and some applications. In Herbert Robbins
Selected Papers. Springer.
[53] Alvin E Roth and Ido Erev. 1995. Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental
data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term. Games and economic
behavior 8, 1 (1995), 164–212.
[54] Martin Schuster and Thomas Schwentick. 2015. Games for Active XML Revisited.
In ICDT.
[55] Lloyd S Shapley et al. 1964. Some topics in two-person games. Advances in game
theory 52, 1-29 (1964), 1–2.
[56] Yoav Shoham. 2008. Computer Science and Game Theory. Commun. ACM 51, 8
(2008).
[57] Hanan Shteingart and Yonatan Loewenstein. 2014. Reinforcement learning and
human behavior. Current Opinion in Neurobiology 25 (04/2014 2014), 93–98.
[58] Aleksandrs Slivkins, Filip Radlinski, and Sreenivas Gollapudi. 2013. Ranked ban-
dits in metric spaces: learning diverse rankings over large document collections.
Journal of Machine Learning Research 14, Feb (2013), 399–436.
[59] Steve Tadelis. 2013. Game Theory: An Introduction. Princeton University Press.
[60] Behrouz Touri and Cedric Langbort. 2013. Language evolution in a noisy envi-
ronment. In (ACC). IEEE.
[61] Q. Tran, C. Chan, and S. Parthasarathy. 2009. Query by Output. In SIGMOD.
[62] Peter Trapa and Martin Nowak. 2000. Nash equilibria for an evolutionary lan-
guage game. Journal of Mathematical Biology 41 (2000).
[63] Aleksandr Vorobev, Damien Lefortier, Gleb Gusev, and Pavel Serdyukov. 2015.
Gathering additional feedback on search results by multi-armed bandits with
respect to production ranking. In Proceedings of the 24th international confer-
ence on World wide web. International World Wide Web Conferences Steering
Committee, 1177–1187.
[64] Yahoo! 2011. Yahoo! webscope dataset anonymized Yahoo! search logs with
relevance judgments version 1.0. http://labs.yahoo.com/Academic_Relations.
(2011). [Online; accessed 5-January-2017].
[65] Yisong Yue, Josef Broder, Robert Kleinberg, and Thorsten Joachims. 2012. The
K-armed Dueling Bandits Problem. J. Comput. Syst. Sci. 78, 5 (2012).
[66] Chengxiang Zhai. 2015. Towards a Game-Theoretic Framework for Information
Retrieval. In SIGIR.
21
